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ABSTRACT | Due to the broadcast nature of radio propaga-
tion, the wireless air interface is open and accessible to both
authorized and illegitimate users. This completely differs
from a wired network, where communicating devices are
physically connected through cables and a node without di-
rect association is unable to access the network for illicit
activities. The open communications environment makes
wireless transmissions more vulnerable than wired communi-
cations to malicious attacks, including both the passive eaves-
dropping for data interception and the active jamming for
disrupting legitimate transmissions. Therefore, this paper is
motivated to examine the security vulnerabilities and threats
imposed by the inherent open nature of wireless communica-
tions and to devise efficient defense mechanisms for improv-
ing the wireless network security. We first summarize the
security requirements of wireless networks, including their
authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues.
Next, a comprehensive overview of security attacks encoun-
tered in wireless networks is presented in view of the net-
work protocol architecture, where the potential security
threats are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide
a survey of the existing security protocols and algorithms
that are adopted in the existing wireless network standards,
such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term evo-
lution (LTE) systems. Then, we discuss the state of the art in
physical-layer security, which is an emerging technique of se-
curing the open communications environment against eaves-
dropping attacks at the physical layer. Several physical-layer
security techniques are reviewed and compared, including
information-theoretic security, artificial-noise-aided security,
security-oriented beamforming, diversity-assisted security,
and physical-layer key generation approaches. Since a jam-
mer emitting radio signals can readily interfere with the legit-
imate wireless users, we also introduce the family of various
jamming attacks and their countermeasures, including the
constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive jammer,
adaptive jammer, and intelligent jammer. Additionally, we
discuss the integration of physical-layer security into existing
authentication and cryptography mechanisms for further se-
curing wireless networks. Finally, some technical challenges
which remain unresolved at the time of writing are summa-
rized and the future trends in wireless security are discussed.
KEYWORDS | Artificial noise; beamforming; denial of service
(DoS); diversity; eavesdropping attack; information-theoretic
security; jamming; network protocol; wireless jamming; wire-
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NOMENCLATURE
3G Third generation.
AAA Authentication, authorization,
and accounting.
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AES Advanced encryption standard.
AKA Authentication and key agreement.
AoA Angle of arrival.
AP Access point.
ARQ Automatic Repeat reQuest.
ASK Authenticated secret key.
BS Base station.
CDMA Code division multiple access.
CK(s) Ciphering key(s).
CSI Channel state information.
CSMA/CA Carrier sense multiple access with
collision avoidance.
CST Carrier sensing time.
CTS Clear to send.
DA Destination address.
DCF Distributed coordination function.
DES Data encryption standard.
DIFS Distributed interframe space.
DN Destination node.
DSSS Direct-sequence spread spectrum.
DoS Denial of service.
EPC Evolved packet core.
E-UTRAN Evolved-universal terrestrial radio
access network.
FFT Fast Fourier transform.
FHSS Frequency-hopping spread spectrum.
FTP File transfer protocol.
GSVD Generalized singular value decomposition.
HSS Home subscriber server.
HTTP Hypertext transfer protocol.
ICMP Internet control message protocol.
ICV Integrity check value.
IK(s) Integrity key(s).
IMSI International mobile subscriber identity.
IP Internet protocol.
IV Initialization vector.
LTE Long-term evolution.
MAC Medium-access control.
MIC Message integrity check.
MIMO Multiple-input–multiple-output.
MISOME Multiple-input–single-output
multiple eavesdropper.
MITM Man in the middle.
MME Mobility management entity.
NIC Network interface controller.
NP Nondeterministic polynomial.
OFDMA Orthogonal frequency-division
multiple access.
OSI Open systems interconnection.
PER Packet error rate.
PKM Privacy and key management.
PN Pseudonoise.
PRNG Pseudorandom number generator.
QoS Quality of service.
RFCOMM Radio-frequency communications.
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman.
RSS Received signal strength.
RTS Request to send.
SA Source address.
SIFS Short interframe space.
SINR Signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio.
SQL Structured query language.
SMTP Simple mail transfer protocol.
SN Source node.
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio.
SS Subscriber station.
SSL Secure sockets layer.
TA Transmitter address.
TCP Transmission control protocol.
TDMA Time-division multiple access.
TK Temporal key.
TKIP Temporal key integrity protocol.
TLS Transport layer security.
TSC TKIP sequence counter.
TTAK TKIP-mixed transmit address and key.
TTLS Tunneled transport layer security.
UDP User datagram protocol.
UE User equipment.
UMTS Universal mobile
telecommunications system.
WEP Wired equivalent privacy.
WiMAX Worldwide interoperability for
microwave access.
WLAN Wireless local area network.
WMAN Wireless metropolitan area network.
WPA Wi-Fi protected access.
WPA2 Wi-Fi protected access II.
WPAN Wireless personal area network.
I . INTRODUCTION
During the past decades, wireless communications infra-
structure and services have been proliferating with the
goal of meeting rapidly increasing demands [1], [2]. Ac-
cording to the latest statistics released by the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union in 2013 [3], the
number of mobile subscribers has reached 6.8 billion
worldwide and almost 40% of the world’s population is
now using the Internet. Meanwhile, it has been reported
in [4] that an increasing number of wireless devices are
abused for illicit cybercriminal activities, including mali-
cious attacks, computer hacking, data forging, financial
information theft, online bullying/stalking, and so on.
This causes the direct loss of about 83 billion euros with
an estimated 556 million users worldwide impacted by
cybercrime each year, according to the 2012 Norton cy-
bercrime report [4]. Hence, it is of paramount impor-
tance to improve wireless communications security to
fight against cybercriminal activities, especially because
more and more people are using wireless networks (e.g.,
cellular networks and Wi-Fi) for online banking and
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personal e-mails, owing to the widespread use of
smartphones.
Wireless networks generally adopt the OSI protocol
architecture [5] comprising the application layer, trans-
port layer, network layer [6], MAC layer [7] and physical
layer [8], [9]. Security threats and vulnerabilities associ-
ated with these protocol layers are typically protected
separately at each layer to meet the security require-
ments, including the authenticity, confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability [10]. For example, cryptography is
widely used for protecting the confidentiality of data
transmission by preventing information disclosure to un-
authorized users [11], [12]. Although cryptography im-
proves the achievable communications confidentiality, it
requires additional computational power and imposes la-
tency [13], since a certain amount of time is required for
both data encryption and decryption [14]. In order to
guarantee the authenticity of a caller or receiver, existing
wireless networks typically employ multiple authentica-
tion approaches simultaneously at different protocol
layers, including MAC-layer authentication [15], network-
layer authentication [16], [17], and transport-layer authen-
tication [18]. To be specific, in the MAC layer, the MAC
address of a user should be authenticated to prevent unau-
thorized access. In the network layer, the WPA and the
WPA2 are two commonly used network-layer authentica-
tion protocols [19], [20]. Additionally, the transport-layer
authentication includes the SSL and its successor, namely
the TLS protocols [21]–[23]. It becomes obvious that ex-
ploiting multiple authentication mechanisms at different
protocol layers is capable of enhancing the wireless secu-
rity, again, at the cost of high computational complexity
and latency. As shown in Fig. 1, the main wireless security
methodologies include the authentication, authorization
and encryption, for which the diverse design factors, e.g.,
the security level, implementation complexity, and com-
munication latency need to be balanced.
In wired networks, the communicating nodes are
physically connected through cables. By contrast, wire-
less networks are extremely vulnerable owing to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Explicitly,
wireless networks are prone to malicious attacks, includ-
ing eavesdropping attack [24], DoS attack [25], spoofing
attack [26], MITM attack [27], message falsification/
injection attack [28], etc. For example, an unauthorized
node in a wireless network is capable of inflicting inten-
tional interferences with the objective of disrupting data
communications between legitimate users. Furthermore,
wireless communications sessions may be readily over-
heard by an eavesdropper, as long as the eavesdropper is
within the transmit coverage area of the transmitting
node. In order to maintain confidential transmission, ex-
isting systems typically employ cryptographic techniques
for preventing eavesdroppers from intercepting data
transmissions between legitimate users [29], [30]. Cryp-
tographic techniques assume that the eavesdropper has
limited computing power and rely upon the computa-
tional hardness of their underlying mathematical prob-
lems. The security of a cryptographic approach would be
compromised, if an efficient method of solving its under-
lying hard mathematical problem was to be discovered
[31], [32].
Recently, physical-layer security is emerging as a
promising means of protecting wireless communications
to achieve information-theoretic security against eaves-
dropping attacks. In [33], Wyner examined a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel consisting of a source, a des-
tination as well as an eavesdropper and proved that per-
fectly secure transmission can be achieved, provided that
the channel capacity of the main link from the source to
the destination is higher than that of the wiretap link
from the source to the eavesdropper. In [34], Wyner’s re-
sults were extended from the discrete memoryless wire-
tap channel to the Gaussian wiretap channel, where the
notion of a so-called secrecy capacity was developed,
which was shown to be equal to the difference between
the channel capacity of the main link and that of the
wiretap link. If the secrecy capacity falls below zero, the
transmissions from the source to the destination become
insecure and the eavesdropper would become capable of
intercepting the source’s transmissions [35], [36]. In or-
der to improve the attainable transmission security, it is
of importance to increase the secrecy capacity by exploit-
ing sophisticated signal processing techniques, such as
the artificial-noise-aided security [37]–[39], security-
oriented beamforming [40], [41], security-oriented diver-
sity approaches [42], [43] and so on.
In this paper, we are motivated to discuss diverse
wireless attacks as well as the corresponding defense
mechanisms and to explore a range of challenging open
issues in wireless security research. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, a
systematic review of security threats and vulnerabilities
is presented at the different protocol layers, commencing
from the physical layer up to the application layer. Sec-
ond, we summarize the family of security protocols andFig. 1.Wireless security methodologies and design factors.
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algorithms used in the existing wireless networks, such
as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and LTE standards.
Third, we discuss the emerging physical-layer security in
wireless communications and highlight the class of
information-theoretic security, artificial-noise-aided secu-
rity, security-oriented beamforming, security-oriented
diversity, and physical-layer secret key generation tech-
niques. Additionally, we provide a review on various
wireless jammers (i.e., the constant jammer, intermittent
jammer, reactive jammer, adaptive jammer, and intelli-
gent jammer) as well as their detection and prevention
techniques. Finally, we outline some of open challenges
in wireless security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the security requirements of wireless
networks, where the authenticity, confidentiality, integ-
rity, and availability of wireless services are discussed. In
Section III, we analyze the security vulnerabilities and
weaknesses of wireless networks at different protocol
layers, including the application layer, the transport
layer, the network layer, the MAC layer, and the physical
layer. Next, in Section IV, the security protocols and al-
gorithms used in existing wireless networks, such as the
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and LTE standards, are dis-
cussed. Then, Section V presents the physical-layer secu-
rity which is emerging as an effective paradigm conceived
for improving the security of wireless communications
against eavesdropping attacks by exploiting the physical-
layer characteristics of wireless channels. In Section VI,
we characterize the family of wireless jamming attacks
and their countermeasures, while in Section VII, we dis-
cuss how physical-layer security may be invoked for effi-
ciently complementing the existing suite of classic
authentication and cryptography mechanisms. These dis-
cussions are followed by Section VIII, where some of the
open challenges and future trends in wireless security are
presented. Finally, Section IX provides our concluding
remarks.
II . SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN
WIRELESS NETWORKS
Again, in wireless networks, the information is ex-
changed among authorized users, but this process is vul-
nerable to various malicious threats owing to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium. The security
requirements of wireless networks are specified for the
sake of protecting the wireless transmissions against
wireless attacks, such as eavesdropping attack, DoS at-
tack, data falsification attack, node compromise attack,
and so on [44], [45]. For example, maintaining data
confidentiality is a typical security requirement, which
refers to the capability of restricting data access to au-
thorized users only, while preventing eavesdroppers
from intercepting the information. Generally speaking,
secure wireless communications should satisfy the
requirements of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability [46], as detailed in the following.
• Authenticity: Authenticity refers to confirming
the true identity of a network node to distin-
guish authorized users from unauthorized users.
In wireless networks, a pair of communicating
nodes should first perform mutual authentication
before establishing a communications link for
data transmission [47]. Typically, a network
node is equipped with a wireless network inter-
face card and has a unique MAC address, which
can be used for authentication purposes. Again,
in addition to MAC authentication, there are
other wireless authentication methods, including
network-layer authentication, transport-layer au-
thentication, and application-layer authentication.
• Confidentiality: The confidentiality refers to lim-
iting the data access to intended users only, while
preventing the disclosure of the information to
unauthorized entities [48]. Considering the sym-
metric key encryption technique as an example,
the source node first encrypts the original data
(often termed as plaintext) using an encryption
algorithm with the aid of a secret key that is
shared with the intended destination only. Next,
the encrypted plaintext (referred to as cipher
text) is transmitted to the destination that then
decrypts its received cipher text using the secret
key. Since the eavesdropper has no knowledge of
the secret key, it is unable to interpret the plain-
text based on the overheard cipher text. Tradition-
ally, the classic Diffie–Hellman key agreement
protocol is used to achieve the key exchange be-
tween the source and destination and requires a
trusted key management center [32]. Recently,
physical-layer security has emerged as a means of
protecting the confidentiality of wireless transmis-
sion against eavesdropping attacks for achieving
information-theoretic security [33], [49]. The de-
tails of physical-layer security will be discussed in
Section V.
• Integrity: The integrity of information transmit-
ted in a wireless network should be accurate and
reliable during its entire life-cycle representing
the source information without any falsification
and modification by unauthorized users. The data
integrity may be violated by so-called insider at-
tacks, such as, for example, node compromise at-
tacks [50]–[52]. More specifically, a legitimate
node that is altered and compromised by an ad-
versary is termed as a compromised node. The
compromised node may inflict damage upon the
data integrity by launching malicious attacks, in-
cluding message injection, false reporting, data
modification, and so on. In general, it is quiet
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challenging to detect the attacks by compromised
nodes, since these compromised nodes running
malicious codes still have valid identities. A
promising solution to detect compromised nodes
is to utilize the automatic code update and recov-
ery process, which guarantees that the nodes are
periodically patched and a compromised node
may be detected, if the patch fails. The compro-
mised nodes can be repaired and revoked through
the so-called code recovery process.
• Availability: The availability implies that the au-
thorized users are indeed capable of accessing a
wireless network anytime and anywhere upon re-
quest. The violation of availability, referred to as
denial of service, will result in the authorized
users to become unable to access the wireless net-
work, which in turn results in unsatisfactory user
experience [53], [54]. For example, any unautho-
rized node is capable of launching DoS activities
at the physical layer by maliciously generating in-
terferences for disrupting the desired communica-
tions between legitimate users, which is also
known as a jamming attack. In order to combat
jamming attacks, existing wireless systems typi-
cally consider the employment of spread spectrum
techniques, including DSSS [55], [56] and FHSS
solutions [57]. To be specific, DSSS employs a PN
sequence to spread the spectrum of the original
signal to a wide frequency bandwidth. In this way,
the jamming attack operating without the knowl-
edge of the PN sequence has to dissipate a much
higher power for disrupting the legitimate trans-
mission, which may not be feasible in practice
due to its realistic power constraint. As an alterna-
tive, FHSS continuously changes the central fre-
quency of the transmitted waveform using a
certain frequency-hopping pattern, so that the
jamming attacker cannot monitor and interrupt
the legitimate transmissions.
The aforementioned authenticity, confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability are summarized in Table 1,
which are commonly considered and implemented in
the existing wireless networks, including the Bluetooth
[58], Wi-Fi [59], WiMAX [60], LTE [61] standards, and
so on. In principle, wireless networks should be as se-
cure as wired networks. This implies that the security
requirements of wireless networks should be the same
as those of wired networks, including the requirements
of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity. However, due to the broadcast nature of radio prop-
agation, achieving these security requirements in
wireless networks is more challenging than in wired
networks. For example, the availability of wireless net-
works is extremely vulnerable, since a jamming attack
imposing a radio signal can readily disrupt and block
the wireless physical-layer communications. Hence,
compared to wired networks, wireless systems typically
employ an additional DSSS (or FHSS) technique in or-
der to protect the wireless transmissions against jam-
ming attacks.
III . SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN
WIRELESS NETWORKS
In this section, we present a systematic review of various
security vulnerabilities and weaknesses encountered in
wireless networks. Apart from their differences, wired
and wireless networks also share some similarities. For
example, they both adopt the OSI layered protocol archi-
tecture consisting of the physical layer, the MAC layer,
the network layer, the transport layer, and the applica-
tion layer. As shown in Fig. 2, a network node (denoted
by node A) employs these protocols for transmitting its
Fig. 2. Generic wireless OSI layered protocol architecture
consisting of the application layer, the transport layer, the
network layer, the MAC layer, and the physical layer.
Table 1 Summarization of Wireless Security Requirements
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data packets to another network node (i.e., node B). To
be specific, the data packet at node A is first extended
with the protocol overheads, including the application-
layer overhead, transport-layer overhead, network-layer
overhead, MAC overhead, and physical-layer overhead.
This results in an encapsulated packet. Then, the resul-
tant data packet is transmitted via the wireless medium
to node B, which will perform packet decapsulation,
commencing from the physical layer and proceeding up-
ward to the application layer, in order to recover the
original data packet. Note that the difference between
the wired and wireless networks mainly lies in the PHY
and MAC layers, while the application, transport, and
network layers of wireless networks are typically identi-
cal to those of wired networks. As a consequence, the
wired and wireless networks share some common secu-
rity vulnerabilities owing to their identical application,
transport, and network layers. Nevertheless, they also
suffer from mutually exclusive attacks due to the fact
that the wired and wireless networks have different PHY
and MAC layers, as shown in Fig. 3.
Table 2 shows the main protocols and specifications im-
plemented at each of wireless OSI layers. For example,
the application-layer supports the HTTP for the sake of
delivering web services, while the FTP is used for large
file transfer, and the SMTP is invoked for electronic
mail (e-mail) transmission and so on [62]. The com-
monly used transport-layer protocols include the TCP
and the UDP [63], [64]. The TCP ensures the reliable
and ordered delivery of data packets, whereas the UDP
has no guarantee of such reliable and ordered delivery.
In contrast to TCP, UDP has no handshaking dialogs and
adopts a simpler transmission model, hence imposing a
reduced protocol overhead. In the network layer, we also
have different protocols, such as the IP, which was con-
ceived for delivering data packets based on IP addresses,
and the ICMP designed for sending error messages for
indicating, for example, that a requested service is un-
available or that a network node could not be reached
[65]. Regarding the MAC layer, there are numerous dif-
ferent protocols adopted by various wireless networks,
such as the CSMA/CA used in Wi-Fi networks, the slot-
ted ALOHA employed in tactical satellite networks by
military forces, CDMA involved in 3G mobile networks
[66] and OFDMA adopted in the LTE and LTE-advanced
networks [67]. Additionally, the physical layer specifies
the physical characteristics of information transmission,
including the transmission medium, modulation, line
coding, multiplexing, circuit switching, pulse shaping,
forward error correction, bit interleaving, and other
channel coding operations.
Every OSI layer has its own unique security chal-
lenges and issues, since different layers rely on different
protocols, hence exhibiting different security vulnerabil-
ities [68]–[70]. Below we summarize the range of wire-
less attacks potentially encountered by various protocol
layers.
A. Physical-Layer Attacks
The physical layer is the lowest layer in the OSI pro-
tocol architecture, which is used for specifying the physi-
cal characteristics of signal transmission. Again, the
broadcast nature of wireless communications makes its
physical layer extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping and
jamming attacks, which are two main types of wireless
physical-layer attacks, as depicted in Table 3. More spe-
cifically, the eavesdropping attack refers to an unautho-
rized user attempting to intercept the data transmission
between legitimate users [71]. In wireless networks, as
long as an eavesdropper lies in the transmit coverage
area of the source node, the wireless communications
session can be overheard by the eavesdropper. In order
to maintain confidential transmission, typically crypto-
graphic techniques relying on secret keys are adopted for
preventing eavesdropping attacks from intercepting the
data transmission. To be specific, the SN and the DN
Fig. 3. Relationship between the wired and wireless attacks.
Table 2 Main Protocols and Specifications of the Wireless OSI Layers
Table 3 Main Types of Wireless Attacks at the PHY Layer
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share a secret key and the so-called plaintext is first en-
crypted at SN, leading to the cipher text, which is then
transmitted to DN. In this case, even if an eavesdropper
overhears the cipher text transmission, it remains diffi-
cult to extract the plaintext from the cipher text without
the secret key.
Moreover, a malicious node in wireless networks can
readily generate intentional interference for disrupting
the data communications between legitimate users,
which is referred to as a jamming attack (also known as
DoS attack) [72]. The jammer aims for preventing autho-
rized users from accessing wireless network resources
and this impairs the network availability for the legiti-
mate users. To this end, spread spectrum techniques are
widely recognized as an effective means of defending
against DoS attacks by spreading the transmit signal over
a wider spectral bandwidth than its original frequency
band. Again, the aforementioned DSSS and FHSS tech-
niques exhibit a high jamming resistance at the physical
layer.
B. MAC-Layer Attacks
The MAC layer enables multiple network nodes to ac-
cess a shared medium with the aid of intelligent channel
access control mechanisms such as CSMA/CA, CDMA,
OFDMA, and so on. Typically, each network node is
equipped with a NIC and has a unique MAC address,
which is used for user authentication. An attacker that at-
tempts to change its assigned MAC address with a mali-
cious intention is termed as MAC spoofing, which is the
primary technique of MAC attacks [73]. Although the
MAC address is hard-coded into the NIC of a network
node, it is still possible for a network node to spoof a
MAC address and thus MAC spoofing enables the mali-
cious node to hide its true identity or to impersonate an-
other network node for the sake of carrying out illicit
activities. Furthermore, a MAC attacker may overhear
the network traffic and steal a legitimate node’s MAC ad-
dress by analyzing the overheard traffic, which is referred
to as an identity-theft attack. An attacker attempting
identity theft will pretend to be another legitimate net-
work node and gain access to confidential information of
the victim node.
In addition to the aforementioned MAC spoofing and
identity theft, the class of MAC-layer attacks also in-
cludes MITM attacks [74] and network injection [75].
Typically, a MITM attack refers to an attacker that first
“sniffs” the network’s traffic in order to intercept the
MAC addresses of a pair of legitimate communicating
nodes, then impersonates the two victims and finally es-
tablishes a connection with them. In this way, the MITM
attacker acts as a relay between the pair of victims and
makes them feel that they are communicating directly
with each other over a private connection. In reality,
their session was intercepted and controlled by the at-
tacker. By contrast, the network injection attack aims for
preventing the operation of networking devices, such as
routers, switches, etc. by injecting forged network re-
configuration commands. In this manner, if an over-
whelming number of the forged networking commands
are initiated, the entire network may become paralyzed,
thus requiring rebooting or even reprogramming of all
networking devices. The main types of wireless MAC at-
tacks are summarized in Table 4.
C. Network-Layer Attacks
In the network layer, IP was designed as the principal
protocol for delivering packets from an SN to a DN
through intermediate routers based on their IP addresses.
The network-layer attacks mainly aim for exploiting IP
weaknesses, which include the IP spoofing and hijacking
as well as the so-called Smurf attack [76]–[78], as illus-
trated in Table 5. To be specific, IP spoofing is used for
generating a forged IP address with the goal of hiding
the true identity of the attacker or impersonating an-
other network node for carrying out illicit activities. The
network node that receives these packets associated with
a forged source IP address will send its responses back to
the forged IP address. This will waste significant network
capacity and might even paralyze the network by flood-
ing it with forged IP packets. IP hijacking is another ille-
gitimate activity launched by hijackers for the sake of
taking over another legitimate user’s IP address. If the at-
tacker succeeds in hijacking the IP address, it will be
able to disconnect the legitimate user and create a new
connection to the network by impersonating the legiti-
mate user, hence gaining access to confidential informa-
tion. There are some other forms of IP hijacking
Table 4 Main Types of Wireless Attacks at the MAC Layer
Table 5 Main Types of Wireless Attacks at the Network Layer
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techniques, including prefix hijacking, route hijacking
and border gateway protocol hijacking [78].
The Smurf attack is a DoS attack in the network
layer, which intends to send a huge number of ICMP
packets (with a spoofed source IP address) to a victim
node or to a group of victims using an IP broadcast ad-
dress [79]. Upon receiving the ICMP requests, the vic-
tims are required to send back ICMP responses,
resulting in a significant amount of traffic in the victim
network. When the Smurf attack launches a sufficiently
high number of ICMP requests, the victim network will
become overwhelmed and paralyzed by these ICMP re-
quests and responses. To defend against Smurf attacks, a
possible solution is to configure the individual users and
routers by ensuring that they do not to constantly re-
spond to ICMP requests. We may also consider the em-
ployment of firewalls, which can reject the malicious
packets arriving from the forged source IP addresses.
D. Transport-Layer Attacks
This section briefly summarizes the malicious activi-
ties in the transport layer, with an emphasis on the TCP
and UDP attacks. To be specific, TCP is a connection-
oriented transport protocol designed for supporting the
reliable transmission of data packets, which is typically
used for delivering e-mails and for transferring files from
one network node to another. In contrast to TCP, UDP
is a connectionless transport protocol associated with a
reduced protocol overhead and latency, but as a price, it
fails to guarantee reliable data delivery. It is often used
by delay-sensitive applications which do not impose strict
reliability requirements, such as IP television, voice over
IP and online games. Both TCP and UDP suffer from se-
curity vulnerabilities including the TCP and UDP flood-
ing as well as the TCP sequence number prediction
attacks, as summarized in Table 6.
TCP attacks include TCP flooding attacks and se-
quence number prediction attacks [80], [81]. The TCP
flooding, which is also known as ping flooding, is a DoS
attack in the transport layer, where the attacker sends an
overwhelming number of ping requests, such as ICMP
echo requests to a victim node, which then responds by
sending ping replies, such as ICMP echo replies. This will
flood both the input and output buffers of the victim
node and it might even delay its connection to the target
network, when the number of ping requests is sufficiently
high. The TCP sequence prediction technique is another
TCP attack that attempts to predict the sequence index of
TCP packets of a transmitting node and then fabricates
the TCP packets of the node. To be specific, the TCP se-
quence prediction attacker first guesses the TCP sequence
index of a victim transmitter, then fabricates packets
using the predicted TCP index, and finally sends its fabri-
cated packets to a victim receiver. Naturally, the TCP se-
quence prediction attack will inflict damage upon the
data integrity owing to the aforementioned packet fabri-
cation and injection.
The UDP is also prone to flooding attacks, which are
imposed by sending an overwhelming number of UDP
packets, instead of ping requests used in the TCP flood
attack. Specifically, a UDP flood attacker transmits a
large number of UDP packets to a victim node, which
will be forced to send numerous reply packets [82]. In
this way, the victim node will be overwhelmed by the
malicious UDP packets and becomes unreachable by
other legitimate nodes. Moreover, the UDP flooding at-
tacker is capable of hiding itself from the legitimate
nodes by using a spoofed IP address for generating mali-
cious UDP packets. The negative impact of such UDP
flooding attacks is mitigated by limiting the response
rate of UDP packets. Furthermore, firewalls can be em-
ployed for defending against the UDP flooding attacks
for filtering out malicious UDP packets.
E. Application-Layer Attacks
As mentioned above, the application layer supports
HTTP [62] for web services, FTP [83] for file transfer
and SMTP [84] for e-mail transmission. Each of these
protocols is prone to security attacks. Logically, the
application-layer attacks may hence be classified as
HTTP attacks, FTP attacks, and SMTP attacks. More spe-
cifically, HTTP is the application protocol designed for
exchanging hypertext across the World Wide Web, which
is subject to numerous security threats. The main HTTP
attacks include the malware attack (e.g., Trojan horse, vi-
ruses, worms, backdoors, keyloggers, etc.), structured
query language (SQL) injection attack, and cross-site
scripting attack [85]. The terminology “malware” refers
to malicious software which is in the form of code,
scripts, and active content programmed by attackers at-
tempting to disrupt legitimate transmissions or to inter-
cept confidential information. The SQL injection is
usually exploited to attack data-driven applications by in-
serting certain rogue SQL statements with an attempt to
gain unauthorized access to legitimate websites. The last
type of HTTP attacks to be mentioned is referred to as
cross-site scripting attacks that typically occur in web ap-
plications and aim for bypassing some of the access con-
trol measures (e.g., the same origin policy) by injecting
client-side scripts into web pages [85].
The FTP is used for large-file transfer from one net-
work node to another, which also exhibits certain
Table 6 Main Types of Wireless Attacks at the Transport Layer
8 Proceedings of the IEEE |
Zou et al. : A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances, and Future Trends
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
security vulnerabilities. The FTP bounce attacks and di-
rectory traversal attacks often occur in FTP applications
[83]. The FTP bounce attack exploits the PORT com-
mand in order to request access to ports through another
victim node, acting as a middle man. We note, however,
that most modern FTP servers are configured by default
to refuse PORT commands in order to prevent FTP
bounce attacks. The directory traversal attack attempts to
gain unauthorized access to legitimate file systems by ex-
ploiting any potential security vulnerability during the
validation of user-supplied input file names. In contrast
to FTP, the SMTP is an application-layer protocol de-
signed for transferring e-mails across the Internet,
which, however, does not encrypt private information,
such as the login username, the password, and the mes-
sages themselves transmitted between the SMTP servers
and clients, hence raising a serious privacy concern.
Moreover, e-mails are frequent carriers of viruses and
worms. Thus, the SMTP attacks include the password
“sniffing,” SMTP viruses, and worms as well as e-mail
spoofing [84]. Typically, antivirus software or firewalls
(or both) are adopted for identifying and guarding
against the aforementioned application-layer attacks.
Table 7 summarizes the aforementioned main attacks at
the application layer.
Finally, we summarize the similarities and differ-
ences between the wireless and wired networks in
terms of their security attacks at the different OSI
layers. As shown in Fig. 4, the application-, transport-,
and network-layer attacks of wireless networks are the
same as those of wired networks, since the wireless and
wired networks share common protocols at the applica-
tion, transport and network layers. By contrast, wireless
networks are different from wired networks in terms of
the PHY and MAC attacks. In general, only the PHY
and MAC layers are specified in wireless networking
standards (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, LTE, etc.). In wireless
networks, conventional security protocols are defined at
the MAC layer (sometimes at the logical-link-control
layer) for establishing a trusted and confidential link,
which will be summarized for different commercial
wireless networks in Section IV. Additionally, the wire-
less PHY layer is completely different from its wireline-
based counterpart. Due to the broadcast nature of radio
propagation, the wireless PHY layer is extremely vulner-
able to both the eavesdropping and jamming attacks. To
this end, physical-layer security is emerging as an effec-
tive means of securing wireless communications against
eavesdropping, as will be discussed in Section V. Next,
Section VI will present various wireless jamming attacks
and their countermeasures.
IV. SECURITY DEFENSE PROTOCOLS
AND PARADIGMS FOR WIRELESS
NETWORKS
This section is focused on the family of security protocols
and paradigms that are used for improving the security
of wireless networks. As compared to wired networks,
the wireless networks have the advantage of avoiding the
deployment of a costly cable-based infrastructure. The
stylized illustration of operational wireless networks is
shown in Fig. 5, where the family of WPANs, WLANs,
and WMANs are illustrated, which complement each
other with the goal of providing users with ubiquitous
broadband wireless services [86]. The objective of Fig. 5
is to provide a comparison among the WPAN, WLAN,
and WMAN techniques from different perspectives in
terms of their industrial standards, coverage area and
peak data rates. More specifically, a WPAN is typically
used for interconnecting with personal devices (e.g., a
keyboard, audio headset, printer, etc.) at a relatively low
data rate and within a small coverage area. For example,
Bluetooth is a common WPAN standard using short-
range radio coverage in the industrial, scientific, and
medical band spanning the band 2400–2480 MHz,
which can provide a peak data rate of 2 Mb/s and a
range of up to 100 m [87]. Fig. 5 also shows that a
WLAN generally has a higher data rate and a wider cov-
erage area than the WPAN, which is used for connecting
wireless devices through an AP within a local coverage
area. As an example, IEEE 802.11 (also known as Wi-Fi)
Table 7 Main Types of Wireless Attacks at the Application Layer
Fig. 4. Comparison between the wireless and wired networks in
terms of security attacks at different OSI layers.
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consists of a series of industrial WLAN standards. Mod-
ern Wi-Fi standards are capable of supporting a peak
data rate of 150 Mb/s and a maximum range of 250 m
[88]. Finally, a MAN is typically used for connecting a
metropolitan city at a higher rate and over a lager cover-
age area than the WPAN and WLAN. For instance, in
Fig. 5, we feature two types of industrial standards for
WMAN, namely WiMAX and LTE [89], [90].
In the following, we will present an overview of the
security protocols used in the aforementioned wireless
standards (i.e., the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and LTE)
for protecting the authenticity, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of legitimate transmissions through the
wireless propagation medium.
A. Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a short-range and low-power wireless
networking standard, which has been widely imple-
mented in computing and communications devices as
well as in peripherals, such as cell phones, keyboards,
audio headsets, etc. However, Bluetooth devices are sub-
ject to a large number of wireless security threats and
may easily become compromised. As a protection, Blue-
tooth introduces diverse security features and protocols
for guaranteeing its transmissions against potentially seri-
ous attacks [91]. For security reasons, each Bluetooth de-
vice has four entities [92], including the Bluetooth
device address (BD_ADDR), private authentication key,
private encryption key and a random number (RAND),
which are used for authentication, authorization and en-
cryption, respectively. More specifically, the BD_ADDR
contains 48 b, which is unique for each Bluetooth de-
vice. The 128-b private authentication key is used for au-
thentication and the private encryption key that varies
from 8 to 128 b in length is used for encryption. In addi-
tion, RAND is a frequently changing 128-b pseudoran-
dom number generated by the Bluetooth device itself.
Fig. 6 illustrates the Bluetooth security architecture,
where the key component is the security manager re-
sponsible for authentication, authorization, and encryp-
tion [91]. As shown in Fig. 6, the service database and
the device database are mainly used for storing the secu-
rity-related information on services and devices, respec-
tively, which can be adjusted through the user interface.
These databases can also be administrated by the general
management entity. When a Bluetooth device receives
an access request from another device, it will first query
its security manager with the aid of its RFCOMM or
other multiplexing protocols. Then, the security manager
has to respond to the query as to whether to allow the
access by checking both the service database and device
database. The generic access profile of Bluetooth defines
three security modes:
1) security mode 1 (nonsecure), where no security
procedure is initiated;
2) security mode 2 (service-level enforced security),
where the security procedure is initiated after es-
tablishing a link between the Bluetooth transmit-
ter and receiver;
3) security mode 3 (link level enforced security),
where the security procedure is initiated before
the link’s establishment [91].
Fig. 6. Bluetooth security architecture.Fig. 5. Family of wireless networks consisting of WPAN, WLAN,
and WMAN.
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In Bluetooth systems, a device is classified into one of
three categories: trusted/untrusted device, authenticated/
unauthenticated device, and unknown device. The trusted
device category implies that the device has been authenti-
cated and authorized as a trusted and fixed relationship,
hence has unrestricted access to all services. By contrast,
the untrusted device category refers to the fact that the
device has indeed been authenticated successfully, but
has no permanent fixed relationship, hence it is restricted
to specific services. If a Bluetooth device is successfully
authenticated, but has not completed any authorization
process, it will be considered as an authenticated device.
By definition, an unauthenticated device failed to authen-
ticate and has a limited access to services. If a device has
not passed any authentication and authorization process,
it is classified as an unknown device and hence it is re-
stricted to access services requiring the lowest privilege.
Additionally, the Bluetooth services are also divided into
the following three security levels: 1) authorization-level
services, which can be accessed by trusted devices only;
2) authentication-level services, which require authenti-
cation, but no authorization, hence, they remain inacces-
sible to the unauthenticated devices and unknown
devices; and 3) open services, which are open to access
by all devices. Below, we would like to discuss the de-
tailed procedures of authentication, authorization, and
encryption in Bluetooth.
The authentication represents the process of verifying
the identity of Bluetooth devices based on the BD_ADDR
and link key. As shown in Fig. 7, the Bluetooth authenti-
cation adopts a “challenge-response scheme” [93], where
the verifier (Unit A) challenges the claimant (Unit B)
which then responds for the sake of authentication. To
be specific, the claimant first requests the verifier to es-
tablish a link and then exchanges a link key that is a
128-b random number. Next, an authentication request
with the claimant’s address BD ADDRB is sent to the
verifier, which returns a random number denoted by
AU RANDA. Then, both the verifier and claimant per-
form the same authentication function using the random
number AU RANDA, the claimant’s address BD ADDRB,
and the link key to obtain their responses denoted by
SRES’ and SRES, respectively. Finally, the claimant sends
its response SRES to the verifier, which will compare
SRES with its own response SRES’. If SRES is identical
to SRES’, the authentication is confirmed. By contrast, a
mismatch between SRES’ and SRES represents an au-
thentication failure.
The authorization process is used for deciding
whether a Bluetooth device has the right to access a
certain service. Typically, trusted devices are allowed to
access all services, however untrusted or unknown de-
vices require authorization, before their access to ser-
vices is granted. Fig. 8 shows a flow chart of the
Bluetooth authorization process. Observe from Fig. 8
that the authorization process commences with check-
ing the device database for deciding whether the Blue-
tooth device was authorized previously and considered
trusted. If the Bluetooth device is trusted, the authori-
zation is concluded. Otherwise, the authorization and
the trust-creation will be performed sequentially. If the
authorization fails, the access to certain services will be
denied. Meanwhile, a successful authorization makes
the corresponding Bluetooth devices trustworthy for ac-
cessing all services.
Additionally, encryption is employed in Bluetooth to
protect the confidentiality of transmissions. The payload
of a Bluetooth data packet is encrypted by using a stream
cipher, which consists of the payload key generator and
Fig. 7. Bluetooth authentication process.
Fig. 8. Flow chart of Bluetooth authorization.
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key stream generator [93]. To be specific, first a payload
key is generated with the aid of the link key and Blue-
tooth device address, which is then used for generating
the key stream. Finally, the key stream and plaintext are
added in modulo-2 in order to obtain the cipher text. It is
pointed out that the payload key generator simply com-
bines the input bits in an appropriate order and shifts
them to four linear feedback shift registers to obtain the
payload key. Moreover, the key stream bits are generated
by using a method derived from the summation stream ci-
pher generator by Toengel [93].
B. Wi-Fi
The family of Wi-Fi networks mainly based on the
IEEE 802.11 b/g standards has been explosively expand-
ing. The most common security protocols in Wi-Fi are
referred to as WEP and WPA [94]. WEP was proposed
in 1999 as a security measure for Wi-Fi networks to
make wireless data transmissions as secure as in tradi-
tional wired networks. However, WEP has been shown
to be a relatively weak security protocol, having numer-
ous flaws. Hence, it can be “cracked” in a few minutes
using a basic laptop computer. As an alternative, WPA
was put forward in 2003 for replacing WEP, while the
improved WPA2 constitutes an upgraded version of the
WPA standard. Typically, WPA and WPA2 are more se-
cure than WEP and thus they are widely used in mod-
ern Wi-Fi networks. Below, we detail the authentication
and encryption processes of the WEP, WPA and WPA2
protocols.
The WEP protocol consists of two main parts, namely
the authentication part and encryption part, aiming for
establishing access control by preventing unauthorized
access without an appropriate WEP key and hence they
achieve data privacy by encrypting the data streams with
the aid of the WEP key. As shown in Fig. 9, the WEP au-
thentication uses a four-step “challenge–response” hand-
shake between a Wi-Fi client and an access point
operating with the aid of a shared WEP key. To be spe-
cific, the client first sends an authentication request to
the access point, which then replies with a plaintext
challenge. After that, the client encrypts its received
“challenge text” using a preshared WEP key and sends
the encrypted text to the access point. It then decrypts
the received encrypted text with the aid of the preshared
WEP key and attempts to compare the decrypted text to
the original plaintext. If a match is found, the access
point sends a successful authentication indicator to the
client. Otherwise, the authentication is considered as
failed.
Following the authentication, WEP activates the pro-
cess of encrypting data streams using the simple Rivest
Cipher 4 Algorithm operating with the aid of the pre-
shared WEP key [96]. Fig. 10 shows a block diagram of
the WEP encryption, where first an initialization vector
(IV) of 24 b is concatenated to a 40-b WEP key. This
leads to a 64-b seed for a PRNG, which is then used for
generating the key stream. Additionally, an integrity
check algorithm is performed such as a cyclic redun-
dancy check on the plaintext in order to obtain an ICV,
which can then be used for protecting the data transmis-
sion from malicious tampering. Then, the ICV is
concatenated with the plaintext, which will be further
combined with the aforementioned key stream in
modulo-2 for generating the cipher text. Although WEP
carries out both the authentication and encryption func-
tions, it still remains prone to security threats. For exam-
ple, WEP fails to protect the information against forgery
and replay attacks, hence an attacker may be capable of
intentionally either modifying or replaying the data
packets without the legitimate users becoming aware that
data falsification and/or replay has taken place. Further-
more, the secret keys used in WEP may be “cracked” in a
few minutes using a basic laptop computer [97]. Addi-
tionally, it is easy for an attacker to forge an authentica-
tion message in WEP, which makes it straightforward for
unauthorized users to pretend to be legitimate users and
hence to steal confidential information [98].
As a remedy, WPA was proposed for addressing the
aforementioned WEP security problems, which wasFig. 9.WEP authentication process.
Fig. 10. Block diagram of WEP encryption.
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achieved by Wi-Fi users without the need of changing
their hardware. The WPA standard has two main types:
1) personal WPA is mainly used in home without
the employment of an authentication server,
where a secret key is preshared between the
client and access point, which is termed as
WPA-PSK (preshared key);
2) enterprise WPA used for enterprise networks,
which requires an authentication server 802.1x
for carrying out the security control in order to
effectively guard against malicious attacks.
The main advantage of WPA over WEP is that WPA
employs more powerful data encryption referred to as
the TKIP, which is assisted by a MIC invoked for the
sake of protecting the data integrity and confidentiality
of Wi-Fi networks [99], [100]. Fig. 11 shows the TKIP
encryption process, in which the TA, the TK, and the
TSC constitute the inputs of the phase I key mixing pro-
cess, invoked in order to obtain a so-called TTAK, which
is then further processed along with the TSC in the
phase II key mixing stage for deriving the WEP seed, in-
cluding a WEP IV and a base key. Furthermore, observe
in Fig. 11 that the MIC is performed both on the SA, as
well as on the DA and the plaintext. The resultant MIC
will then be appended to the plaintext, which is further
fragmented into multiple packets, each assigned with a
unique TSC. Finally, the WEP seed and plaintext packets
are used for deriving the cipher text by invoking the
WEP encryption, as discussed in Fig. 10, which is often
implemented in the hardware of Wi-Fi devices. We note
that even the WPA relying on the TKIP remains vulnera-
ble to diverse practical attacks [101].
WiMAX (also known as IEEE 802.16) is a standard
developed for WMAN and the initial WiMAX system
was designed for providing a peak data rate of 40 Mb/s.
In order to meet the requirements of the International
Mobile Telecommunications-Advanced initiative, IEEE
802.16m was proposed as an updated version of the
original WiMAX, which is capable of supporting a peak
data rate of 1 Gb/s for stationary reception and 100 Mb/s
for mobile reception [102]. As all other wireless systems,
WiMAX also faces various wireless attacks and provides
advanced features for enhancing the attainable transmis-
sion security. To be specific, a security sub-layer is intro-
duced in the protocol stack of the WiMAX standard, as
shown in Fig. 12 [103].
C. WiMAX
It is observed from Fig. 12(a) that the protocol stack
of a WiMAX system defines two main layers, namely the
physical layer and the MAC layer. Moreover, the MAC
layer consists of three sublayers, namely the service-
specific convergence sublayer, the common part sub-
layer, and the security sublayer. All the security issues
and risks are considered and addressed in the security
sublayer. Fig. 12(b) shows the WiMAX security sublayer,
which will be responsible for authentication, authoriza-
tion, and encryption in WiMAX networks. The security
sublayer defines a so-called PKM protocol, which con-
siders the employment of the X.509 digital certificate
along with the RSA public-key algorithm and the AES al-
gorithm for both user authentication as well as for key
management and secure transmissions. The initial PKM
version (PKMv1) as specified in early WiMAX standards
(e.g., IEEE 802.16a/c) employs an unsophisticated one-
way authentication mechanism and hence it is vulnerable
to MITM attacks. To address this issue, an updated PKM
version (PKMv2) was proposed in the more sophisticated
WiMAX standard releases (e.g., IEEE 802.16e/m) [104],
which relies on two-way authentication. The following
discussions detail both the WiMAX authentication as
well as the authorization and encryption processes.
Fig. 11. Illustration of TKIP encryption process.
Fig. 12.WiMAX protocol stack: (a) PHY-MAC illustration; and
(b) security sublayer specification.
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Authentication in WiMAX is achieved by the PKM
protocol, which supports two basic authentication ap-
proaches, namely the RSA-based authentication and the
EAP-based authentication [105]. Fig. 13 shows the RSA-
based authentication process, where a trusted certificate
authority is responsible for issuing an X.509 digital cer-
tificate to each of the network nodes, including the SS
and the WiMAX BS. An X.509 certificate contains both
the public key and the MAC address of its associated net-
work node. During the RSA-based authentication process
shown in Fig. 13, when an SS receives an authentication
request from a WiMAX BS, it sends its X.509 digital cer-
tificate to the BS, which then verifies whether the certifi-
cate is valid. If the certificate is valid, the SS is
considered authenticated. By contrast, an invalid certifi-
cate implies that the SS fails to authenticate.
The EAP-based authentication process is illustrated in
Fig. 14, where a WiMAX BS first sends an identity re-
quest to an SS who responds with its identity informa-
tion. The WiMAX BS then forwards the SS’s identity to
an AAA server over a secure networking protocol re-
ferred to as RADIUS. After that, the SS and the AAA
server start the authentication process, where three dif-
ferent EAP options are available depending on the SS
and AAA server’s capability, including the EAP–AKA,
EAP–TLS, and EAP–TTLS. Finally, the AAA server will
indicate the success (or failure) of the authentication
and notify the SS.
Additionally, the authorization process is necessary
for deciding whether an authenticated SS has the right
to access certain WiMAX services [106]. In the WiMAX
authorization process, an SS first sends an authorization
request message to the BS that contains both the SS’ X.
509 digital certificate, as well as the encryption algo-
rithm and the cryptographic identity (ID). After receiv-
ing the authorization request, the BS validates the SS’
request by interacting with an AAA server and then
sends back an authorization reply to the SS. Once the
positive authorization is confirmed, the SS will be al-
lowed to access its intended services. Following user au-
thentication and authorization, the SS is free to
exchange data packets with the BS. In order to guarantee
transmission confidentiality, WiMAX considers the em-
ployment of the AES algorithm for data encryption,
which is much more secure than the DES algorithm
[107]. Unlike the DES that uses the Feistel cipher design
principles of [107], the AES cipher is based on a so-
called substitution-permutation network and has a vari-
able block size of 128, 192, or 256 b [108]. This key
length specifies the number of transformation stages
used for converting the plaintext into cipher text. In
WiMAX, the AES algorithm supports several different
modes, including the cipher-block chaining mode, coun-
ter mode, and electronic codebook mode.
D. Long-Term Evolution
LTE is the most recent standard developed by the 3G
partnership project for next-generation mobile networks
designed for providing seamless coverage, high data rate,
and low latency [109]. It supports packet switching for
seamless interworking with other wireless networks and
also introduces many new elements, such as relay sta-
tions, home eNodeB (HeNB) concept, etc. An LTE net-
work typically consists of an EPC and an E-UTRAN, as
shown in Fig. 15 [90], [110]. The EPC comprises an
MME, a serving gateway, a packet data network gateway
(PDN GW), and an HSS. Moreover, the E-UTRAN in-
cludes a base station (also termed as eNodeB in LTE)
and several UE. If channel conditions between the UE
and eNodeB are poor, a relay station may be activated
for assisting their data communications. Furthermore,
both in small offices and in residential environments, a
HeNB may be installed for improving the indoor cover-
age by increasing both the capacity and reliability of the
E-UTRAN. Although introducing these elements into
Fig. 13. RSA-based authentication process.
Fig. 14. EAP-based authentication process.
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LTE is capable of improving the network coverage and
quality, it has its own new security vulnerabilities and
threats.
In order to facilitate secure packet exchange between
the UE and EPC, a so-called EPS–AKA protocol was pro-
posed for defending LTE networks against various at-
tacks, including redirection attacks, rogue base station
attacks [111], and MITM attacks. A two-way authentica-
tion process was invoked between the UE and EPC,
which is adopted in the EPS–AKA protocol responsible
for generating both the CKs and the IKs [112]. Both the
CKs and the IKs are used for data encryption and integ-
rity check for enhancing the confidentiality and integrity
of LTE transmissions. Fig. 16 shows this two-way authen-
tication process of the LTE system using the EPS–AKA
protocol, where an UE and an LTE network should vali-
date each other’s identity.
To be specific, the MME first sends a user identity
verification request to the UE that then replies back with
its unique IMSI. Next, the MME sends an authentication
data request to HSS, which consists of the UE’s IMSI
and the serving network’s identity. Upon receiving the
request, the HSS responds to the MME by sending back
an EPS authentication vector containing the quantities
(RAND, XRES, AUTN, KSI ASME), where RAND is an in-
put parameter, while XRES is an output of the authenti-
cation algorithm at the LTE network side. Furthermore,
AUTN indicates the identifier of the network authority,
while KSI ASME is the key set identity of the access secu-
rity management entity. Then, the MME sends an au-
thentication request to the UE containing the RAND,
AUTN, and KSI ASME quantities. As a result, the UE
checks its received parameter AUTN for authenticating
the LTE network. If the network authentication is suc-
cessful, the UE generates the response RES and sends it
to the MME, which compares XRES with RES. If XRES
is the same as RES, this implies that the UE also passes
the authentication.
In the UMTS, also known as the 3G mobile cellular
system, KASUMI [113] is used as the ciphering algo-
rithm for protecting the data confidentiality and integ-
rity, which, however, has several security weaknesses
and hence it is vulnerable to certain attacks, such as the
related-key attack [113]. To this end, the LTE system
adopts a more secure ciphering technique referred to as
SNOW 3G [114] that is a block-based ciphering solution
used as the heart of LTE confidentiality and integrity al-
gorithms, which are referred to as the UEA2 and UIA2,
respectively [114]. The SNOW 3G technique is referred
to as a stream cipher having two main components,
namely an internal state of 608 b controlled by a 128-b
key and a 128-b IV, which are utilized for generating
the cipher text by masking the plaintext. During the
SNOW 3G operation process, we first perform key ini-
tialization to make the cipher synchronized to a clock
signal and a 32-b key stream word is produced in con-
junction with every clock.
In summary, in Sections IV-A–IV-D, we have dis-
cussed the security protocols of Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX
as well as of LTE and observed that the existing wireless
networks tend to rely on security mechanisms deployed at
the upper OSI layers of Fig. 2 (e.g., MAC layer, network
layer, transport layer, etc.) for both user authentication
and data encryption. For example, the WEP and WPA
constitute a pair of security protocols commonly used in
Wi-Fi networks for guaranteeing the data confidentiality
and integrity requirements, whereas WiMAX networks
adopt the PKM protocol for achieving secure transmis-
sions in the face of malicious attacks. By contrast, com-
munication security at physical layer has been largely
ignored in existing wireless security protocols. However,
due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the
physical layer of wireless transmission is extremely vul-
nerable to both eavesdropping and jamming attacks. This
Fig. 16. Two-way authentication in LTE by using the
EPS–AKA protocol.
Fig. 15. LTE network architecture.
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necessitates the development of physical-layer security as
a complement to conventional upper-layer security proto-
cols. The following section will introduce the physical-
layer security paradigm conceived for facilitating secure
wireless communications.
V. WIRELESS PHYSICAL-LAYER
SECURITY AGAINST EAVESDROPPING
In this section, we portray the field of wireless physical-
layer security, which has been explored for the sake of
enhancing the protection of wireless communications
against eavesdropping attacks. Fig. 17 shows a wireless
scenario transmitting from a source to a destination in
the presence of an eavesdropper, where the main and
wiretap links refer to the channels spanning from the
source to the destination and to the eavesdropper, re-
spectively. As shown in Fig. 17, when a radio signal is
transmitted from the source, multiple differently delayed
signals will be received at the destination via different
propagation paths due to the signal reflection, diffraction
and scattering experienced. Owing to the multipath ef-
fects, the differently delayed signal components some-
times add constructively, sometimes destructively.
Hence, the attenuation of the signal that propagated
through the space fluctuates in time, which is referred to
as fading and it is usually modeled as a random process.
The signal received at the destination may be attenuated
significantly, especially when a deep fade is encountered,
due to the shadowing in the presence of obstacles (e.g.,
trees) between the source and destination. Moreover,
due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the
source signal may be overheard by the eavesdropper,
which also experiences a multipath fading process. There
are three typical probability distribution models routinely
used for characterizing the random wireless fading, in-
cluding the Rayleigh fading [115], Rice fading [116], and
Nakagami fading [117].
Recently, physical-layer security has been emerging
as a promising paradigm designed for improving the se-
curity of wireless transmissions by exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels [33], [34], [118].
More specifically, it was shown in [33] that reliable
information-theoretic security can be achieved, when the
wiretap channel spanning from the source to the eaves-
dropper is a degraded version of the main channel be-
tween the source and the destination. In [34], a so-called
secrecy capacity was developed and shown as the differ-
ence between the capacity of the main channel and that
of the wiretap channel, where a positive secrecy capacity
means that reliable information-theoretic security is pos-
sible and vice versa. However, in contrast to wired chan-
nels that are typically time invariant, wireless channels
suffer from time-varying random fading, which results in
a significant degradation of the wireless secrecy capacity
[119], especially when a deep fade is encountered in the
main channel due to shadowing by obstacles (e.g., build-
ings, trees, etc.) appearing between the source and the
destination. Hence considerable research efforts have
been devoted to the development of various physical-
layer security techniques, which can be classified into
the following main research categories:
1) information-theoretic security [119]–[125];
2) artificial-noise-aided security [126]–[130];
3) security-oriented beamforming techniques
[131]–[136];
4) diversity-assisted security approaches [42], [137];
5) physical-layer secret key generation [147]–[161].
The aforementioned physical-layer security tech-
niques are summarized in Fig. 18. In the following, we
will detail these physical-layer security topics.
A. Information-Theoretic Security
Information-theoretic security examines fundamental
limits of physical-layer security measures from an
information-theoretic perspective. The concept of
information-theoretic security was pioneered by Shannon
in [119], where the basic theory of secrecy systems was
developed with an emphasis on the mathematical struc-
ture and properties. To be specific, Shannon defined a
secrecy system as a set of mathematical transformations
of one space (the set of legitimate plaintext messages)
into another space (the set of possible cryptograms),
where each transformation corresponds to enciphering
the information with the aid of a secret key. Moreover,
Fig. 17.Wireless scenario transmitting from source to
destination in multipath fading environments in the presence of
an eavesdropper.
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the transformation is nonsingular so that unique deci-
phering becomes possible, provided that the secret key is
known. In [119], the notions of theoretical secrecy and
practical secrecy were introduced, which was developed
for the ease of guarding against eavesdropping attacks,
when an adversary is assumed to have either infinite or
more practically finite computing power. It was shown
in [119] that a perfect secrecy system may be created, de-
spite using a finite-length secret key, where the equivo-
cation at the adversary does not approach zero, i.e.,
when the adversary is unable to obtain a unique solution
to the cipher text. To elaborate a little further, the equiv-
ocation is defined as a metric of quantifying how uncer-
tain the adversary is of the original cipher text after the
act of message interception [119].
The secrecy system developed by Shannon in [119] is
based on the employment of secret keys. However, the
key management is challenging in certain wireless net-
works operating without a fixed infrastructure (e.g.,
wireless ad hoc networks) [32]. To this end, in [33],
Wyner investigated the information-theoretic security
without using secret keys and examined its performance
limits for a discrete memoryless wiretap channel consist-
ing of a source, a destination and an eavesdropper. It
was shown in [33] that perfectly secure transmission can
be achieved, provided that the channel capacity of the
main link spanning from the SN to its DN is higher than
that of the wiretap link between the SN and eavesdrop-
per. In other words, when the main channel conditions
are better than the wiretap channel conditions, there ex-
ists a positive rate at which the SN and DN can reliably
and securely exchange their information. In [34],
Wyner’s results were further extended to a Gaussian
wiretap channel, where the notion of secrecy capacity
was developed, which was obtained as the difference be-
tween the channel capacity of the main link and that of
the wiretap link. If the secrecy rate is chosen below the
secrecy capacity, reliable transmission from SN to DN
can be achieved in perfect secrecy. In wireless networks,
the secrecy capacity is severely degraded due to the
time-varying fading effect of wireless channels. This is
because fading attenuates the signal received at the legit-
imate destination, which reduces the capacity of the le-
gitimate channel, thus resulting in a degradation of the
secrecy capacity.
The family of MIMO systems is widely recognized
as an effective means of mitigating the effects of wire-
less fading, which simultaneously increases the secrecy
capacity in fading environments. In [120], Khisti et al.
investigated a so-called MISOME scenario, where both
the source and eavesdropper are equipped with multiple
antennas, whereas the intended destination has a single
antenna. Assuming that the fading coefficients of all the
associated wireless channels are fixed and known to all
nodes (i.e., to the source, destination and eavesdrop-
per), the secrecy capacity of the MISOME scenario can
be characterized in terms of its generalized eigenvalues.
Bearing in mind that the knowledge of the wiretap
channel’s impulse response is typically unavailable,
Khisti et al. [121] advocated the employment of a so-
called masked beamforming scheme [118] for enhancing
wireless physical-layer security, where the eavesdrop-
per’s channel knowledge is not relied upon for deter-
mining the transmit directions. It was shown that the
masked beamforming scheme is capable of achieving a
near-optimal security performance at sufficiently high
SNRs. Moreover, Khisti et al. extended their results to
time-varying wireless channels and developed both an up-
per and a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the
MISOME scenario operating in Rayleigh fading environ-
ments. In a nutshell, the work of Khisti et al. [121] was
mainly focused on characterizing the secrecy capacity of
masked beamforming in an information-theoretic sense,
which thus belongs to the family of information-theoretic
security solutions.
Fig. 18. Classification of physical-layer security techniques.
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As a further development, Khisti et al. [122] exam-
ined the information-theoretic security achieved with the
aid of multiple antennas in a more general scenario,
where the source, the destination, and the eavesdropper
are assumed to have multiple antennas. They considered
two cases: 1) the simplified and idealized deterministic
case in which the CSIs of both the main links and of the
wiretap links are fixed and known to all the nodes; and
2) the more practical fading scenario, where the wireless
channels experience time-varying Rayleigh fading and
the source has the main channels’ perfect CSI as well as
the wiretap channels’ statistical CSI knowledge. For the
idealized deterministic case, they proposed the employ-
ment of the GSVD-based approach for increasing the se-
crecy capacity in high SNR regions. The GSVD scheme’s
performance was then further investigated in the fading
scenario and the corresponding secrecy capacity was
shown to approach zero if and only if the ratio of the
number of eavesdropper antennas to source antennas was
larger than two. Additionally, in [123], Chrysikos et al. in-
vestigated the wireless information-theoretic security in
terms of outage secrecy capacity, which is used for char-
acterizing the maximum secrecy rate under a given out-
age probability requirement. A closed-form expression of
the outage secrecy capacity was derived in [123] by using
the first-order Taylor series for approximation of an expo-
nential function.
The MIMO wiretap channel can also be regarded as
a MIMO broadcast channel, where SN broadcasts its
confidential information to both its legitimate DN and
unintentionally also to an unauthorized eavesdropper.
Perfect secrecy is achieved, when SN and DN can reli-
ably communicate at a positive rate, while ensuring that
the mutual information between the SN and eavesdrop-
per becomes zero. In [124], Oggier and Hassibi ana-
lyzed the secrecy capacity of multiple-antenna-aided
systems by converting the MIMO wiretap channel into
a MIMO broadcast channel, where the number of an-
tennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter and the pair
of receivers (i.e., that of DN and of the eavesdropper).
It was proven that through optimizing the transmit co-
variance matrix, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel is given by the difference between the
capacity of the SN-to-DN channel and that of the
SN-to-eavesdropper channel. It was pointed out that the se-
crecy capacity results obtained in [124] are based on
the idealized simplifying assumption that SN knows the
CSI of both the main channels and of the wiretap chan-
nels. This assumption is, however, invalid in practical
scenarios, since the eavesdropper is passive and hence it
remains an open challenge to estimate the eavesdrop-
per’s CSI. It is of substantial interest to study a more
practical scenario, where SN only has statistical CSI
knowledge of wiretap channels. To this end, He et al.
[125] investigated a twin-receiver MIMO broadcast
wiretap channel scenario, where the legitimate SN and
DN are assumed to have no knowledge of the eaves-
dropper’s CSI. A so-called “secrecy-degree-of-freedom
region” was developed for wireless transmission in the
presence of an eavesdropper and a GSVD-based scheme
was proposed for achieving the optimal secrecy-degree-
of-freedom region. The major information-theoretic se-
curity techniques are summarized in Table 8.
B. Artificial-Noise-Aided Security
The artificial-noise-aided security allows SN to gener-
ate specific interfering signals termed as artificial noise
so that only the eavesdropper is affected adversely by the
interfering signals, while the intended DN remains unaf-
fected. This results in a reduction of the wiretap chan-
nel’s capacity without affecting the desired channel’s
capacity and thus leads to an increased secrecy capacity,
which was defined as the difference between the main
channel’s and the wiretap channel’s capacity. Hence, a
security improvement is achieved by using artificial
noise. In [126], Goel and Negi considered a wireless net-
work consisting of an SN, a DN, and an eavesdropper for
investigating the benefits of the artificial noise genera-
tion paradigm. More specifically, SN allocates a certain
fraction of its transmit power for producing artificial
Table 8 Major Information-Theoretic Security Techniques
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noise, so that only the wiretap channel condition is de-
graded, while the desired wireless transmission from SN
to DN remains unaffected by the artificial noise. To
meet this requirement, Goel and Negi [126] proposed
the employment of multiple antennas for generating arti-
ficial noise and demonstrated that the number of trans-
mit antennas at SN has to be higher than that of the
eavesdropper for ensuring that the artificial noise would
not degrade the desired channel. It was shown that a
nonzero secrecy capacity can be guaranteed for secure
wireless communications by using artificial noise, even if
the eavesdropper is closer to SN than DN.
Although the artificial-noise-aided security is capable
of guaranteeing the secrecy of wireless transmission, this
is achieved at the cost of wasting precious transmit
power resources, since again, a certain amount of trans-
mit power has to be allocated for generating the artificial
noise. In [127], Zhou an McKay further examined the op-
timal transmit power sharing between the information-
bearing signal and the artificial noise. They analyzed
secure multiple-antenna communications relying on arti-
ficial noise and derived a closed-form secrecy capacity ex-
pression for fading environments, which was used as the
objective function for quantifying the optimal power shar-
ing between the information signal and artificial noise.
The simple equal-power sharing was shown to be a near-
optimal strategy, provided that the eavesdroppers do not
collude with each other to jointly perform interception.
Moreover, as the number of eavesdroppers increases,
more power should be allocated for generating the artifi-
cial noise. In the presence of imperfect CSI, it was ob-
served that assigning more power to the artificial noise
for jamming the eavesdroppers is capable of achieving a
better security performance than increasing the transmit
power of the desired information signal.
However, the aforementioned artificial-noise-aided
security work has been mainly focused on improving the
secrecy capacity without considering the QoS require-
ments of the legitimate DN. Hence, in order to address
this problem, a QoS-based artificial-noise-aided security
approach was presented in [128] for minimizing the
maximum attainable SINR encountered at the eavesdrop-
pers, while simultaneously guaranteeing a satisfactory
SINR at the intended DN. The optimization of the artifi-
cial noise distribution was formulated based on the CSIs
of both the main channels and wiretap channels, which
was shown to be a nondeterministic polynomial-time
hard (NP-hard) problem. The classic SDR technique
[128] was used for approximating the solution of this
NP-hard problem. Liao et al. [128] demonstrated that the
proposed QoS-based artificial-noise-aided security
scheme is capable of efficiently guarding against eaves-
dropping attacks, especially in the presence of a large
number of eavesdroppers. Li and Ma [129] proposed a ro-
bust artificial-noise-aided security scheme for a MISOME
wiretap channel. Assuming that SN has perfect CSI
knowledge of the main channels, but imperfect CSI
knowledge of the wiretap channels, an optimization prob-
lem was formulated for the secrecy rate maximization
with respect to both the desired signal’s and the artificial
noise’s covariance, which is a semi-infinite optimization
problem and can be solved with the aid of a simple 1-D
search algorithm. It was shown that the proposed robust
artificial noise design significantly outperforms conven-
tional nonrobust approaches in terms of its secrecy
capacity.
In addition to relying on multiple antennas for artifi-
cial noise generation, cooperative relays may also be uti-
lized for producing artificial noise to guard against
eavesdropping attacks. In [130], Goeckel et al. studied
the employment of cooperative relays for artificial noise
generation and proposed a secret wireless communica-
tions protocol, where a messaging relay was used for as-
sisting the legitimate transmissions from SN to DN and a
set of intervening relays were employed for generating
the artificial noise invoked for jamming the eavesdrop-
pers. The main focus of [130] was to quantify how many
eavesdroppers can be tolerated without affecting the
communications secrecy in a wireless network support-
ing a certain number of legitimate nodes. It was shown
that if the eavesdroppers are uniformly distributed and
their locations are unknown to the legitimate nodes, the
tolerable number of eavesdroppers increases linearly
with the number of legitimate nodes. The major artificial-
noise-aided security techniques are summarized in
Table 9.
C. Security-Oriented Beamforming Techniques
The family of security-oriented beamforming tech-
niques allows SN to transmit its information signal in a
particular direction to the legitimate DN, so that the sig-
nal received at an eavesdropper (that typically lies in a
direction different from DN) experiences destructive in-
terference and hence it becomes weak. Thus, the RSS of
DN would become much higher than that of the eaves-
dropper with the aid of security-oriented beamforming,
leading to a beneficial secrecy capacity enhancement. In
[131], Zhang and Gursoy proposed the employment of co-
operative relays to form a beamforming system relying
on the idealized simplifying assumption of having the
perfect CSI knowledge of all the main channels as well
as of the wiretap channels and conceived a decode-and-
forward-relay-based beamforming design for maximizing
the secrecy rate under a fixed total transmit power con-
straint. The formulated problem was then solved by
using the classic semidefinite programming and second-
order cone programming techniques. It was shown in
[131] that the proposed beamforming approach is capable
of significantly increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless
transmissions.
In [132], multiple antennas were used for beamform-
ing in order to improve the attainable secrecy capacity of
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wireless transmissions from SN to DN in the presence of
an eavesdropper. In contrast to the work presented in
[131], where the perfect CSI knowledge of the wiretap
channel was assumed, Mukherjee and Swindlehurst con-
ceived the optimal beamforming designs in [132] without
relying on the idealized simplifying assumption of know-
ing the eavesdropper’s CSI, albeit the exact CSI of the
main channel spanning from SN to DN was still assumed
to be available. However, the perfect CSI of the main
channel is typically unavailable at SN. To this end,
Mukherjee and Swindlehurst further studied the impact of
imperfect CSI on the attainable physical-layer security per-
formance and presented a pair of robust beamforming
schemes that are capable of mitigating the effect of chan-
nel estimation errors. It was shown that the proposed ro-
bust beamforming techniques perform well for moderate
CSI estimation errors and hence achieve a higher secrecy
capacity than the artificial-noise-aided security approaches.
In addition, Jeong et al. [133] investigated the benefits
of transmit beamforming in an amplify-and-forward relay
network consisting of an SN, an RN, and a DN, where
the RN is indeed potentially capable of improving the
SN-to-DN link, but it is also capable of launching a pas-
sive eavesdropping attack. Hence, a pair of secure beam-
forming schemes, namely a noncooperative beamformer
and a cooperative secure beamformer, were proposed for
maximizing the secrecy capacity of the SN-to-DN link.
Extensive simulation results were provided for demon-
strating that the secure beamforming schemes proposed
are capable of outperforming conventional security ap-
proaches in terms of the attainable secrecy capacity.
Moreover, in [134], a cross-layer approach exploiting the
multiple simultaneous data streams of the family of oper-
ational IEEE 802.11 standards was devised by using zero-
forcing beamforming, where a multiantenna-assisted AP
was configured to utilize one of its data streams for com-
municating with the desired user, while the remaining
data streams were exploited for actively interfering with
the potential eavesdroppers. Extensive experimental eval-
uations were carried out in practical indoor WLAN envi-
ronments, demonstrating that the proposed zero-forcing
beamforming method consistently granted an SINR for
the desired user, which was 15 dB higher than that of the
eavesdropper.
Naturally, this beamforming technique may also be
combined with the artificial-noise-based approach for the
sake of further enhancing the physical-layer security of
wireless transmissions against eavesdropping attacks.
Hence, in [135], Qin et al. examined a joint beamforming
and artificial-noise-aided design for conceiving secure
wireless communications from SN to DN in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. The beamforming weights and
artificial noise covariance were jointly optimized by min-
imizing the total transmit power under a specific target
secrecy rate constraint. To elaborate a little further, this
joint beamforming and artificial-noise-aided design prob-
lem was solved by using a two-level optimization ap-
proach, where the classic semidefinite relaxation method
and the golden-section-based method [135] were invoked
for the inner-level optimization and the outer-level opti-
mization, respectively. Numerical results illustrated that
the joint beamforming and artificial-noise-aided scheme
significantly improves the attainable secrecy capacity of
wireless transmission as compared to the conventional
security-oriented beamforming approaches. In [136],
Romero-Zurita et al. studied the joint employment of
spatial beamforming and artificial noise generation for
enhancing the attainable physical-layer security of a
MISO channel in the presence of multiple eavesdrop-
pers, where no CSI knowledge was assumed for the wire-
tap channel. The optimal power sharing between the
information signal and artificial noise was examined un-
der a specific guaranteed secrecy probability require-
ment. By combining the beamforming and artificial noise
techniques, both the security and reliability of wireless
transmissions were substantially improved. The major
security-oriented beamforming techniques are summa-
rized in Table 10.
D. Diversity-Assisted Security Approaches
This section is focused on the portrayal of diversity
techniques invoked for the sake of improving the
physical-layer security of wireless transmissions [137]. In
contrast to the artificial-noise-aided approaches, which
Table 9 Major Artificial-Noise-Aided Security Techniques
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dissipate additional power assigned to the artificial noise
generation, the diversity-aided security paradigm is capa-
ble of enhancing the wireless security without any addi-
tional power. Traditionally, diversity techniques have
been used for improving the attainable transmission reli-
ability, but they also have a substantial potential in terms
of enhancing the wireless security against eavesdropping
attacks. Below we will discuss several diversity-aided se-
curity approaches, including multiple-antenna-aided di-
versity, multiuser diversity, and cooperative diversity.
Multiple-antenna-aided transmit diversity has been
shown to constitute an effective means of combatting
the fading effect, hence also increasing the secrecy ca-
pacity of wireless transmissions [138], [139]. As shown
in Fig. 19, provided that SN has multiple antennas, the
optimal antenna can be activated for transmitting the de-
sired signal, depending on whether the CSI of the main
channel and of the wiretap channel is available. To be
specific, if the CSI of both the main channel and of the
wiretap channel is known at SN, the specific transmit
antenna associated with the highest secrecy capacity can
be chosen as the optimal antenna to transmit the desired
signal, which has the potential of significantly improving
the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions. If only the
main channel’s CSI is available, we can choose a transmit
antenna associated with the highest main channel capac-
ity to transmit the desired signal. Since the transmit an-
tenna selection is exclusively based on the main channel’s
CSI and the wiretap channel is typically independent of
the main channel, the main channel’s capacity will be in-
creased with the aid of transmit antenna selection, while
no capacity improvement can be achieved for the wiretap
channel. This finally results in an increase of the secrecy
capacity, as an explicit benefit of transmit antenna
selection.
The multiuser diversity of Fig. 20 also constitutes an
effective means of improving the physical-layer security
in the face of eavesdropping attacks. Considering that a
BS serves multiple users in a cellular network, an orthog-
onal multiple access mechanism, such as the OFDMA of
LTE [140] or CDMA of 3G systems [141], enables the
multiple users to communicate with the BS. Considering
the OFDMA as an example, given a slot or subband of
OFDM subcarriers, we should determine which particu-
lar user is assigned to access this specific subband for
data transmission. More specifically, a user is enabled
with the aid of multiuser scheduling to access the OFDM
Table 10 Major Security-Oriented Beamforming Techniques
Fig. 19.MIMO wireless system consisting of an SN and a DN in
the presence of an eavesdropper, where M, Nd, and Ne represent
the number of antennas at SN, DN, and eavesdropper,
respectively.
Fig. 20.Multiuser diversity system consisting of a BS and
M users in the presence of an eavesdropper.
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subband and then starts transmitting its signal to the BS.
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of wireless me-
dium, an eavesdropper may intercept the source mes-
sage. In order to effectively protect the wireless
transmission against eavesdropping attacks, the multiuser
scheduling should be designed for minimizing the capac-
ity of the wiretap channel, while maximizing the capacity
of the main channel [142]. This action requires the CSI
of both the main channel and of the wiretap channel. If
only the main channel’s CSI is available, the multiuser
scheduling can be designed for maximizing the main
channel’s capacity without the wiretap channel’s CSI
knowledge. It is worth mentioning that the multiuser
scheduling is capable of significantly improving the main
channel’s capacity, while the wiretap channel’s capacity
remains the same, which results in a secrecy capacity im-
provement with the aid of multiuser diversity, even if
the CSI of the wiretap channel is unknown.
As an alternative, cooperative diversity [143], [144]
also has a great potential in terms of protecting the wire-
less transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. When
considering a wireless network consisting of a single SN,
multiple RNs, and a DN as shown in Fig. 21, the multi-
ple relays can be exploited for assisting the signal trans-
mission from SN to DN. In order to prevent the
eavesdropper from intercepting the source signal from a
security perspective, the best relay selection emerges as
a means of improving the security of wireless transmis-
sions against eavesdropping attacks [145]. Specifically, an
RN having the highest secrecy capacity (or the highest
main channel capacity if only the main channel’s CSI is
known) is selected to assist the SN’s transmission to the
intended DN. By using the best RN selection, a benefi-
cial cooperative diversity gain can be achieved for the
sake of increasing the secrecy capacity, which explicitly
demonstrates the advantages of wireless physical-layer
security.
E. Physical-Layer Secret Key Generation
In this section, we present the family of wireless se-
cret key generation techniques by exploiting the physical-
layer characteristics of radio propagation, including the
amplitude and phase of wireless fading [146]. To be spe-
cific, as shown in Fig. 22, a pair of legitimate trans-
ceivers, namely Alice and Bob are connected through a
reciprocal wireless channel, where the fading gain of the
main channel spanning from Alice to Bob, denoted by
hab, is identical to that from Bob to Alice, namely hba.
Since Alice and Bob can directly estimate hba and hab, re-
spectively, using classic channel estimation methods
[147], [148], they may exploit their estimated CSIs h^ba
and h^ab for the secret key generation and agreement pro-
cess. By contrast, a third party (e.g., Eve) based at a dif-
ferent location experiences independent wiretap channels
of hae and hbe, which are uncorrelated with the CSIs hab
and hba of the main legitimate channel between Alice and
Bob, as seen in Fig. 22. Since Alice and Bob both estimate
the main channel by themselves without exchanging their
estimated CSIs h^ab and h^ba over the air, it is impossible
for Eve to acquire the main channel’s CSI for deriving
and duplicating the secret keys. The secret key extraction
and agreement process based on the physical characteris-
tics of the main channel is capable of achieving reliable
information-theoretic security without resorting to a fixed
key management infrastructure [149].
The research of physical-layer key generation and
agreement can be traced back to the middle of the 1990s
[150], [151], where the feasibility of generating secret
keys based on the wireless channel’s CSI was shown to
achieve reliable information-theoretic security without
devising any practical key extraction algorithms. To this
end, an RSS-based secret key extraction algorithm was
proposed in [152] by exploiting RSS measurements of
the main channel in order to generate secret bits for an
IEEE 802.11 network in an indoor wireless environment.
In [153], Jana et al. further investigated the key
Fig. 21. Cooperative diversity system consisting of an SN,
M relays, and a DN in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Fig. 22.Wireless system consisting of two legitimate transceivers
(Alice and Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve).
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generation rate of RSS-based secret key extraction in di-
verse wireless environments. It was shown in [153] that
it is possible to generate secret bits at a sufficiently high
rate based on the wireless channel variations in highly
dynamic mobile scenarios. However, in static environ-
ments, where the network devices are fixed, the rate of
bits generated is too low to be suitable for a secret key,
which is due to the lack of random variations in the
wireless channels.
To this end, Gollakota and Katabi [154] proposed the
so-called iJam approach, which processed the desired
transmit signal in a specific manner that still allows the
legitimate receiver to decode the desired signal, but pre-
vents the potential eavesdroppers from decoding it. The
iJam scheme renders the secret key generation both fast
and independent of the wireless channel variations. Fur-
thermore, a testbed was also developed in [154] for im-
plementing the iJam technique using USRP2 radios and
the IEEE 802.11 specifications. The associated experimen-
tal results demonstrated that the iJam scheme was indeed
capable of generating the physical-layer secret keys faster
than conventional approaches. To be specific, the iJam
scheme generated secret keys at a rate of 3–18 kb/s
without any measurable disagreement probability,
whereas the conventional approaches exhibited a maxi-
mum generation rate of 44 b/s in conjunction with a
4% bit disagreement probability between the legitimate
transmitter and receiver. More recently, an extension of
the RSS-based key extraction from a twin-device system
to a multidevice network was studied in [155], where a
collaborative key generation scheme was proposed for
multiple devices by exploiting the RSS measurements
and then experimentally validating it in both indoor
and outdoor environments.
Although it is feasible to exploit the RSS for wireless
secret key extraction and agreement, the RSS-based
methods have a low key generation rate, which limits
their applications in practical wireless systems. In order
to alleviate this problem, the channel phase may also be
considered as an alternative means of assisting the gener-
ation of secret keys, which is capable of beneficially ex-
ploiting the phase measurements across different carriers
and thus enhances the secret key generation rate. In
[156], Shehadeh et al. proposed a channel-phase-based
key agreement scheme, which generates secret bits from
the time-varying frequency-domain characteristics in an
OFDM-based wireless system. More specifically, the
OFDM system’s subcarrier phase correction process was
studied in the context of secret key generation, showing
that the employment of higher FFT sizes is potentially
capable of improving the secret bit generation rate. Addi-
tionally, Wang et al. [157] employed multiple randomized
channel phases for conceiving an efficient key generation
scheme, which was evaluated through both analytical
and simulation studies. This solution was found to be
highly flexible in the context of multiuser wireless
networks and increased the secret key generation rate by
orders of magnitude. It has to be pointed out that ex-
ploiting the phase measurements across multiple OFDM
subcarriers is beneficial in terms of increasing the attain-
able key generation rate. However, the channel phase ex-
tracted by a pair of legitimate devices is unlikely to be
reciprocal due to the different hardware characteristics
of the different devices. This nonreciprocity embedded
in the phase measurements results in a high disagree-
ment rate for the legitimate devices during the genera-
tion of secret keys.
As an alternative, MIMO techniques used by the le-
gitimate transceivers are capable of significantly increas-
ing the channel’s randomness, which can be exploited
for secret key generation and agreement, leading to the
concept of MIMO-based key generation. In [158], a theo-
retical characterization of the MIMO-based key genera-
tion was explored in terms of deriving a performance
limit on the number of secret key bits generated per ran-
dom channel realization, assuming that the main channel
and the wiretap channel are Rayleigh distributed. As a
further development, Zeng et al. proposed a practical
multiple-antenna-based secret key generation protocol in
[159], which was implemented for an IEEE 802.11 net-
work in both indoor and outdoor mobile environments.
It was also shown in [160] that even if an eavesdropper
is capable of increasing the number of its antennas, it
cannot infer more information about the secret keys gen-
erated from the main channel. However, the secrecy im-
provement of MIMO-based secret key generation is
achieved at the cost of an increased system complexity,
since more computing and memory resources are re-
quired for estimating the MIMO channel, as the number
of transmit/receive antennas increases. In order to fur-
ther improve the reliability and efficiency of secret key
generation, the employment of relay nodes was investi-
gated in [160] for assisting the secret key generation in
two different scenarios, namely in conjunction with a
single-antenna-aided relay and a multiple-antenna as-
sisted relay, respectively. It was demonstrated in [160]
that the relay-channel-based key generation method is
capable of substantially improving the key generation
rate in Rayleigh fading environments. Although the re-
lay nodes can be exploited for enhancing the key gener-
ation rate, they may become compromised by an
adversary aiming for launching malicious activities.
Hence, it is of interest to explore the security issues as-
sociated with untrusted relays as well as the corre-
sponding countermeasures.
It is worth mentioning that the success of the afore-
mentioned physical-layer key generation solutions relies
on the assumption that the main channel between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver is reciprocal and
uncorrelated with the wiretap channel experienced at an
eavesdropper located more than half-a-wavelength away
from the legitimate receiver. However, this assumption
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has not been rigorously evaluated in the open literature
and indeed, it maybe invalid in some practical scenarios,
which do not experience extensive multipath scattering.
It was shown in [161] that in reality a strong correlation
may be encountered between the main channel and the
wiretap channel, even when the eavesdropper is located
significantly more than half-a-wavelength away from the
legitimate receiver. In [161], Edman et al. demonstrated
that a so-called passive inference attacker is potentially
capable of exploiting this correlation for inferring a part
of the secret keys extracted between a pair of legitimate
devices. Additionally, in [162], Eberz et al. presented a
practical MITM attack against the physical-layer key gen-
eration and showed that the MITM attack can be readily
launched by impersonating the legitimate transmitter
and receiver as well as by injecting the eavesdropper’s
data packets. It was demonstrated in [162] that the
MITM attack is capable of imposing intentional sabotag-
ing of the physical-layer key generation by inflicting a
high key disagreement rate, while additionally inferring
up to 47% of the secret keys generated between the legit-
imate devices.
In order to mitigate the effects of MITM attacks,
Shi et al. [163] examined the potential benefits of si-
multaneous device authentication and secret key extrac-
tion based on the wireless physical-layer characteristics,
where an ASK scheme was proposed by exploiting the
heterogeneous channel characteristics in the context of
wireless body area networks. Specifically, in case of
simple routine body movements, the variations of wire-
less channels between line-of-sight on-body devices are
relatively insignificant, while the wireless channels be-
tween the non-line-of-sight devices fluctuate quiet sig-
nificantly. The ASK scheme exploits the relatively static
channels for reliable device authentication and the dy-
namically fluctuating channels for secret key generation.
Extensive experiments were conducted by using low-
end commercial-off-the-shelf sensors, demonstrating
that the ASK scheme is capable of effectively authenti-
cating body devices, while simultaneously generating
secret keys at a high rate. More importantly, the ASK is
resilient to MITM attacks, since it performs the authen-
tication and key generation simultaneously. Conse-
quently, it becomes difficult for an MITM attacker to
promptly pass through the authentication phase and to
get involved in the resultant key generation phase. The
major physical-layer secret key generation techniques
are summarized in Table 11 at a glance.
VI. WIRELESS JAMMING ATTACKS AND
THEIR COUNTERMEASURES
As mentioned earlier, due to the shared nature of radio
propagation, wireless transmissions are vulnerable to
both the eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In Section V,
we have presented a comprehensive overview of how phys-
ical-layer security may be exploited for guarding against
eavesdropping. Let us now focus our attention on the fam-
ily of wireless jamming attacks and their countermeasures
in this section. In wireless networks, a jamming attack can
be simply launched by emitting unwanted radio signals
to disrupt the transmissions between a pair of legitimate
nodes.
The objective of a jamming attacker (also referred to
as jammer) is to interfere with either the transmission or
the reception (or both) of legitimate wireless communi-
cations. For example, a jammer may continuously trans-
mit its signal over a shared wireless channel so that
legitimate nodes always find the channel busy and keep
deferring their data transmissions. This, however, is
energy-inefficient, since the jammer has to transmit con-
stantly. To improve its energy efficiency, a jammer may
opt for transmitting an interfering signal only when it de-
tects that a legitimate transmitter is sending data. There
are many different types of wireless jammers, which may
be classified into the following five categories [164]:
1) constant jammer, where a jamming signal is
continuously transmitted;
Table 11 Major Physical-Layer Secret Key Generation Techniques
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2) intermittent jammer, where a jamming signal is
emitted from time to time;
3) reactive jammer, where a jamming signal is only
imposed, when the legitimate transmission is de-
tected to be active;
4) adaptive jammer, where a jamming signal is tai-
lored to the level of received power at the legiti-
mate receiver;
5) intelligent jammer, where weaknesses of the
upper-layer protocols are exploited for blocking
the legitimate transmission.
Clearly, the first four types of jammers all exploit
the shared nature of the wireless medium and can be
regarded as wireless physical-layer jamming attacks. By
contrast, the intelligent jammer attempts to capitalize
on the vulnerabilities of the upper-layer protocols [165],
including the MAC, network, transport, and application
layers. Typically, the network, transport, and applica-
tion layers are defined in the TCP/IP protocols and not
specified in wireless standards (e.g., Bluetooth, WLAN,
etc.), which are responsible for the PHY and MAC
specifications only. The jammers targeting the network,
transport and application layers essentially constitute
DoS attacks (e.g., Smurf attack, TCP/UDP flooding,
malware attack, etc.), which have been summarized in
Section III-C–E. Let us now discuss the aforementioned
five main types of wireless jamming attacks and their
countermeasures in a little more detail.
A. Constant Jammer
Again, the constant jammer continuously transmits a
jamming signal over the shared wireless medium. The
jamming signal can have an arbitrary waveform associ-
ated with a limited bandwidth and constrained power,
including but not limited to pseudorandom noise, modu-
lated Gaussian waveforms, or any other signals. The ef-
fect of a constant jammer is twofold. On the one hand, it
increases the interference and noise level for the sake of
degrading the signal reception quality at a legitimate re-
ceiver. On the other hand, it also makes a legitimate
transmitter always find the wireless channel busy, which
keeps preventing the legitimate transmitter from gaining
access to the channel. Hence, the constant jammer is ca-
pable of disrupting the legitimate communications, re-
gardless of the specific wireless system. However, the
constant jammer is energy inefficient, since it has to con-
tinuously transmit a jamming signal.
The basic idea behind detecting the presence of a
constant jammer is to identify an abnormal signal re-
ceived at a legitimate receiver [164], [166]. There are
certain statistical tests that can be exploited for the de-
tection of the constant jammer, such as the RSS, CST,
PER, etc. To be specific, the RSS test is based on a natu-
ral measurement used for detecting the presence of a
constant jammer, since the signal strength received at a
legitimate node would be directly affected by the pres-
ence of a jamming signal. The RSS detector first accumu-
lates the energy of the signal received during an
observation time period and then compares the accumu-
lated energy to a predefined threshold to decide as to
whether a constant jammer is present or absent. If the
accumulated energy is higher than the threshold, imply-
ing that a jamming signal may be present, then the pres-
ence of a constant jammer is confirmed. As an
alternative, the CST can also be used as a measurement
for deciding whether a constant jammer is preventing
the legitimate transmission, since the CST distribution
will be affected by the jammer. More specifically, the
presence of a jamming signal may render the wireless
channel constantly busy and hence might lead to an un-
usually high CST, which can be used for jammer
detection.
Additionally, the PER is defined as the number of un-
successfully decoded data packets divided by the total
number of received packets, which can also be used for
detecting the presence of a jamming signal, since the le-
gitimate communications will be severely corrupted by
the constant jammer, leading to an unduly high PER.
Normally, the legitimate wireless communications links
operating in the absence of a jammer should have a rela-
tively low PER (e.g., lower than 0.1). Indeed, it was
shown in [166] that even in a highly congested network,
the PER is unlikely to exceed 0.2. By contrast, in the
presence of an effective jammer, the legitimate data
transmissions will be overwhelmed by the jamming signal
and background noise. This would result in an excessive
PER, close to one [166], which indicates that indeed, the
PER may be deemed to be an effective measurement for
detecting the presence of a constant jammer. Conversely,
an ineffective jammer, which only slightly affects the
PER, fails to inflict a significant damage upon the legiti-
mate wireless system and thus may not have to be de-
tected for invoking further countermeasures.
Once the presence of a jammer is detected, it is nec-
essary to decide upon how to defend the legitimate trans-
missions against jamming attacks. Frequency hopping is
a well-known classic anti-jamming technique [167]–
[169], which rapidly changes the carrier frequency with
the aid of a pseudorandom sequence known to both the
transmitter and the receiver. The frequency hopping re-
gime can be either proactive or reactive. In proactive fre-
quency hopping, the transmitter will proactively perform
pseudorandom channel switching, regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of the jammer. Hence, proactive hop-
ping does not have to detect the presence of a jammer.
By contrast, reactive frequency hopping starts switching
to a different channel only when the presence of a jam-
ming signal is detected. Compared to proactive hopping,
reactive hopping has the advantage of requiring a re-
duced number of frequency hops for achieving a certain
level of secrecy. Overall, frequency hopping is highly
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resistant to jamming attacks, unless of course the jammer
has explicit knowledge of the pseudorandom hopping
pattern. Typically, cryptographic techniques are used for
generating the pseudorandom hopping pattern under the
control of a secret key that is preshared by the legitimate
transmitter and receiver.
B. Intermittent Jammer
An attacker, which transmits a jamming signal from
time to time for the sake of interfering with the legiti-
mate communications, is referred to as an intermittent
jammer [170]. The intermittent jammer transmits for a
certain time and then sleeps for the remaining time.
Typically, increasing the sleeping time would save more
energy for the jammer, which of course comes at the
cost of a performance degradation in terms of the jam-
ming effectiveness, since less time becomes available for
transmitting the jamming signal. The jammer can strike
a tradeoff between the jamming effectiveness and energy
savings by appropriately adjusting the transmit time and
sleeping time. Hence, compared to the constant jammer,
the intermittent jammer generally reduces the energy
consumption, which is attractive for energy-constrained
jammers.
Similarly to the constant jammer, the presence of an
intermittent jammer will affect the same statistical mea-
surements of the legitimate transmissions, including the
RSS, CST, and PER, which thus can be used for its detec-
tion. After detecting an intermittent jammer, again fre-
quency hopping may be activated for protecting the
legitimate transmissions. More specifically, when a legiti-
mate node is deemed to be jammed, it switches to an-
other channel and communicates with its destination
over the newly established link.
C. Reactive Jammer
The reactive jammer starts to transmit its jamming
signal only when it detects that the legitimate node is
transmitting data packets [171], [172]. This type of jam-
mer first senses the wireless channel and upon detecting
that the channel is busy, implying that the legitimate
user is active, it transmits a jamming signal for the sake
of corrupting the data reception at the legitimate re-
ceiver. The success of a reactive jammer depends on its
sensing accuracy concerning the legitimate user’s status.
For example, when the legitimate signal received at a re-
active jammer is weak (e.g., due to fast fading and sha-
dowing effects) and hence cannot be detected, the
reactive jammer then becomes ineffective in jamming
the legitimate transmissions. In contrast to both constant
and intermittent jammers that attempt to block the wire-
less channel regardless of the legitimate traffic activity
on the channel, the reactive jammer remains quiet when
the channel is idle and starts emitting its jamming signal
only when the channel is deemed to be busy. This
implies that the reactive jammer is more energy efficient
than both the constant and intermittent jammers.
The detection of the presence of a reactive jammer is
typically harder than that of the constant and intermit-
tent jammers. As discussed above, the constant and inter-
mittent jammers both intend to interfere with the
reception of a legitimate data packet as well as to hinder
the transmission of the legitimate packets by maliciously
seizing the wireless channel. By contrast, a reactive jam-
mer inflicts less damage, since it corrupts the reception
without affecting the legitimate transmitter’s activity to
gain access to the wireless channel. This means that the
CST becomes an ineffective measurement for detecting
the reactive jammer. Since the reception of legitimate
wireless communications will be affected in the presence
of a reactive jammer, we can still consider the employ-
ment of RSS- and PER-based techniques for the detection
of the reactive jammer. Generally, an abnormal increase
of the RSS and/or a surprisingly high PER indicate the
presence of a reactive jammer.
An effective technique of preventing a reactive jam-
mer from disrupting communications is to assist the le-
gitimate user in becoming undetectable, because then
the jammer remains silent. DSSS [173] techniques spread
the radio signal over a very wide frequency bandwidth,
so that the signal has a low PSD, which may even be be-
low the background noise level. This makes it difficult
for a reactive jammer to differentiate the DSSS modu-
lated legitimate signal from the background noise. In this
way, the reactive jammer may become unable to track
the legitimate traffic activity and thus cannot disrupt the
legitimate transmissions. Additionally, the aforemen-
tioned frequency hopping technique is also effective in
guarding against a reactive jamming attack, as long as
the hopping rate is sufficiently high (e.g., faster than the
jammer reacts).
D. Adaptive Jammer
The adaptive jammer refers to an attacker who can
adjust its jamming power to any specific level required
for disrupting the legitimate receiver [174]. More specifi-
cally, in wireless communication systems, the RSS de-
pends on the time-varying fading. If the main channel
spanning from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver
is relatively good and the signal arriving at the legitimate
receiver is sufficiently strong, the adaptive jammer may
have to increase its jamming power for the sake of cor-
rupting the legitimate reception. One the other hand, if
the main channel itself experiences an outage due to a
deep fade, then naturally, the legitimate receiver is un-
able to succeed in decoding its received signal even in
the absence of a jammer. In this extreme case, no jam-
ming power is needed for the adaptive jammer. Hence,
compared to the constant, intermittent, and reactive jam-
mers, the adaptive jammer is the most energy-efficient
jamming attacker, which can achieve the highest energy
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efficiency when aiming for disrupting the legitimate
transmissions. It can be observed that the adaptive jam-
mer should have the RSS knowledge of the legitimate re-
ceiver for adapting its jamming power, which, however,
is challenging for a jammer to obtain in practice, since
the main channel’s RSS varies in time and it is unknown
to the jammer. This limits the application of the adaptive
jammer in practical wireless systems. The adaptive jam-
mer usually serves as an idealized optimum jamming at-
tacker for benchmarking purposes.
The detection of an adaptive jammer is challenging in
the sense that it will dynamically adjust its jamming
power to conceal its existence. Similarly to the reactive
jammer, the adaptive jammer transmits nothing if the le-
gitimate transmission is deemed to be inactive, implying
that the CST technique is ineffective for detecting the
adaptive jammer. Although the RSS- and PER-based solu-
tions can be employed for detecting the presence or ab-
sence of an adaptive jammer, the separate employment
of the two individual statistics may be insufficient. As a
consequence, Xu et al. proposed a so-called consistency
check method in [166], which relies on the joint use of
the RSS and PER measurements. To be specific, if both
the RSS and the PER are unexpectedly high, it is most
likely that there is a jammer, which results in a high RSS
due to the presence of a jamming signal that interferes
with the legitimate reception, leading to a high PER. If
we encounter a low RSS and a high PER, this implies
that the main channel is poor. Moreover, the joint occur-
rence case of a high RSS and a low PER indicates that
the legitimate transmissions perform well. Finally, it is
unlikely in general that both the RSS and PER are low
simultaneously.
As mentioned above, the adaptive jammer is an ideal-
ized adversary who is assumed to have knowledge of the
legitimate signal characteristics, including the RSS, car-
rier frequency and bandwidth, waveform, and so on. In
order to guard against such a sophisticated jamming at-
tacker, a simple but effective defense strategy is to evade
the adversary. Hence, in [166], Xu et al. proposed a pair
of evasion methods to defend against jamming attacks,
namely the channel surfing and the spatial retreating so-
lutions. To be specific, in channel surfing, the legitimate
transmitter and receiver are allowed to change their
jammed channel to a new channel operating at the link
layer, which is a different philosophy from that of fre-
quency hopping operating at the physical layer. The spa-
tial retreating technique enables a jammed wireless node
to move away and escape from the jammed area to avoid
the jamming signal. In case of spatial retreating, it is cru-
cial to accurately determine the position of jammers,
which enables the victims to move away from the
jammed area. To this end, in [175], Liu et al. proposed
an error-minimizing framework for accurately localizing
multiple jammers by relying on a direct measurement of
the jamming signal strength, demonstrating its advantage
over conventional methods in terms of its localization
accuracy.
E. Intelligent Jammer
The jamming attackers discussed so far belong to the
family of physical-layer jammers operating without tak-
ing into account any upper-layer protocol specifications.
By contrast, an intelligent jammer is assumed to have a
good understanding of the upper-layer protocols and at-
tempts to jam the vitally critical network control packets
(rather than data packets) by exploiting the associated
protocol vulnerabilities. This section is mainly focused
on the jamming of MAC control packets. For example,
let us consider the MAC jamming of the IEEE 802.11
standard (also known as Wi-Fi) that is widely used for
WLANs [176]. The IEEE 802.11 MAC procedure is re-
ferred to as the DCF [177], which is shown in Fig. 23.
To be specific, if a source node senses the channel to be
idle, it waits for a time period termed as the DIFS and
then sends an RTS control frame to an AP. After suc-
ceeding in decoding the RTS frame and waiting for a
time period called the SIFS, the AP will send a CTS con-
trol frame, which indicates that the AP is ready to re-
ceive data packets. Finally, the source node waits for a
SIFS time duration and starts transmitting a data packet
to the AP, which will send an ACK frame after a SIFS
time interval to confirm that it successfully decoded the
data packet.
In order to block the legitimate communications be-
tween the source node and the AP of Fig. 23, an intelli-
gent jammer can simply corrupt the RTS/CTS control
frames, rather than data packets, which minimizes its en-
ergy consumption. There are several different types of in-
telligent jamming attackers, including the RTS jammer,
the CTS jammer, and the ACK jammer. More specifically,
Fig. 23. IEEE 802.11 DCF process.
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an RTS jammer senses the channel to be idle for a DIFS
time period, and then transmits a jamming signal for cor-
rupting a possible RTS packet. By contrast, a CTS jam-
mer attempts to detect the presence of an RTS frame
and upon detecting the RTS arrival, it waits for the RTS
period plus a SIFS time interval before sending a jam-
ming pulse for disrupting the CTS frame. The CTS jam-
ming strategy will result in a zero throughput for the
legitimate transmissions, since no data packets will be
transmitted by the source node without successfully re-
ceiving a CTS frame. Similarly to the CTS jamming, an
ACK jammer also senses the wireless medium. Upon de-
tecting the presence of a packet, it waits for a SIFS time
interval at the end of the data packet transmission and
then jams the wireless channel, leading to the corruption
of an ACK frame. If the source node constantly fails to
receive the ACK, it will finally give up transmitting data
packets to the AP.
The aforementioned intelligent jammers can be de-
tected by tracing the traffic of MAC control packets to
identify abnormal events in terms of sending and/or re-
ceiving RTS, CTS, and ACK frames. For example, if the
AP (or source node) consistently fails to send and receive
the RTS, CTS, or ACK, it may indicate the presence of
an intelligent jammer. As mentioned earlier, an intelli-
gent jammer takes advantage of specific upper-layer pro-
tocol parameters for significantly degrading the network
performance. In order to defend against such an intelli-
gent jammer, a protocol hopping approach, as a generali-
zation of the physical-layer frequency hopping, was
proposed in [178], which allows legitimate nodes to hop
across various protocol parameters that the jammer may
exploit. A game-theoretic framework was formulated in
[178] for modeling the interactions between an intelli-
gent jammer and the protocol functions, which was
shown to achieve an improved robustness against intelli-
gent jamming attacks.
Finally, Table 12 summarizes the characteristics of
the constant, intermittent, reactive, adaptive, and intelli-
gent jammers in terms of their energy efficiency, jam-
ming effectiveness, implementation complexity, and
prior knowledge requirements. As shown in Table 12,
the constant and intermittent jammers have a low imple-
mentation complexity and required no prior knowledge
for effectively jamming the legitimate communications,
but their energy efficiency is poor. By contrast, the adap-
tive and intelligent jammers achieve a high energy effi-
ciency and jamming effectiveness, which however,
require some prior knowledge (e.g., the legitimate main
channel quality, the protocol parameters, etc.) and have
a high complexity. As an alternative, the reactive jammer
exhibits a high jamming effectiveness and, at the same
time, achieves a moderate performance in terms of its
energy efficiency, implementation complexity, and prior
knowledge requirements.
VII. INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL-LAYER
SECURITY INTO EXISTING
WIRELESS NETWORKS
As discussed earlier, the authentication and encryption
constitute a pair of salient techniques adopted in existing
wireless security architectures for satisfying the stringent
authenticity and integrity requirements of wireless net-
works (e.g., Wi-Fi, LTE, etc.). Meanwhile, physical-layer
security has emerged as a new means of enhancing the
security of wireless communications, which is typically
considered as a complement to the existing classic au-
thentication and cryptography mechanisms, rather than
replacing them [179]. Recently, there have been growing
research efforts devoted to the integration of physical-
layer security into the existing body of classic wireless
authentication and cryptography [179]–[193]. Below we
present an in-depth discussion on the physical-layer au-
thentication and cryptography solutions conceived for
wireless networks.
Authentication constitutes an essential security re-
quirement designed for reliably differentiating autho-
rized nodes from unauthorized ones in wireless
networks. Conventionally, the MAC address of a network
node has been used for authentication, which is how-
ever, vulnerable to MAC spoofing attacks and can be ar-
bitrarily changed for the sake of impersonating another
network node. To this end, an increasing research
Table 12 Characteristics of Different Jamming Attacks
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attention has been devoted to the physical-layer authenti-
cation [180]–[190] of wireless networks, where either
the hardware properties of RF-based devices (also known
as device fingerprints) or the propagation characteristics
of wireless channels (e.g., the time-varying fading) have
been employed for authentication. This line of work is
based on the premise that both the device fingerprints
and the wireless channels are unique and nonforgeable
by an adversary. To elaborate a little further, the random
manufacturing imperfections lead to the fact that a pair
of RF devices, even produced by the same manufactur-
ing and packaging process, would have different hard-
ware specifications, as exemplified by their clock timing
deviations and CFOs, which can be invoked as unique
fingerprints for device identification. Additionally, as
mentioned in Section V-E, an adversary located at least
at a distance of half-a-wavelength away from the legiti-
mate receiver experiences an independent fading chan-
nel. This would make it a challenge for the adversary to
predict and mimic the wireless channel between the le-
gitimate users, which can thus be used as a unique link-
specific signature for physical-layer authentication.
Specifically, in [180], a clock-timing-based hardware
fingerprinting approach was proposed for differentiating
the authorized devices from spoofing attackers in Wi-Fi
networks, which is passive and noninvasive, hence re-
quiring no extra cooperation from the fingerprintee
hosts. It was shown by extensive experiments that the
clock-timing-based fingerprint identification is accurate
and very effective in differentiating between Wi-Fi de-
vices. Later on, Brik et al. [181] considered the joint use
of multiple distinctive radiometric signatures, including
the frequency error, synchronization frame correlation,
I/Q offset, magnitude error, and phase error, which were
inferred from the modulated symbols for identifying dif-
ferent IEEE 802.11 network nodes. This technique was
termed as PARADIS [181]. Quantitatively, the experi-
mental results demonstrated that by applying sophisti-
cated machine-learning algorithms, PARADIS was
capable of differentiating the legitimate nodes with a
probability of at least 99% in a set of more than 130 net-
work nodes equipped with identical 802.11 NICs in the
presence of background noise and wireless fading.
As a design alternative, a CFO-based physical-layer
authentication scheme was proposed in [182], where the
expected CFO was estimated with the aid of Kalman fil-
tering fed with previous CFO estimates. Then, the ex-
pected CFO was compared to the current CFO estimate
in order to determine, whether the received radio signal
obeys a consistent CFO pattern. To be specific, if the dif-
ference between the expected CFO and the current CFO
estimate was higher than a predefined threshold, it indi-
cated the presence of an unknown wireless device. More-
over, the threshold value was adaptively adjusted based
on both the background noise level and on the Kalman-
prediction-based errors for the sake of further improving
the authentication accuracy. Additionally, an SDR-based
prototype platform was developed in [182] for validating
the feasibility of the proposed CFO-based wireless device
authentication in the face of multipath fading channels.
In addition to the device fingerprint-based authenti-
cation solutions [180]–[182], the wireless channel is also
considered as an effective metric for device authentica-
tion [183]–[187]. Specifically, in [183], Xiao et al. studied
the employment of channel probing and responses for
determining whether an unauthorized user is attempting
to invade a wireless network. The reliability of the pro-
posed CSI-based authentication scheme was analyzed in
the face of complex Gaussian noise environments. The
simulation results relying on the ray-tracing tool WiSE
validated the efficiency of the CSI-based authentication
approach under a range of realistic practical channel
conditions. However, this approach is vulnerable to the
so-called mimicry attacker, which is able to forge a CSI
signature, as long as the attacker roughly knows the radio
signal at the legitimate receiver’s location. In order to
guard against the mimicry attack, a time-synchronized
link signature was presented in [184] by integrating the
timing factor into the wireless physical-layer features.
The provided experimental results showed that the pro-
posed time-synchronized physical-layer authentication is
indeed capable of mitigating the mimicry attack with a
high probability.
More recently, in [185], the AoA information was
exploited as a highly sensitive physical-layer signature for
uniquely identifying each client in IEEE 802.11 networks.
To be specific, a multiantenna AP was relied upon, in or-
der to estimate all the directions a client’s radio signals
arrive from. Once spotting a suspicious transmission, the
AP and the client initiate an AoA signature-based au-
thentication protocol for mitigating the attack. It was
shown in [185] that the proposed AoA signature-based
authentication scheme was capable of preventing 100%
of Wi-Fi spoofing attacks, while maintaining a false
alarm probability of just 0.6%. As a further develop-
ment, Du et al. [186] examined the extension of physical-
layer authentication from single-hop communication
networks to dual-hop scenarios by proposing a pair of
physical-layer authentication mechanisms, namely the
PHY–CRAMR and PHY–AUR techniques for wireless
networks operating in the presence of an untrusted re-
lay. The security performance of the PHY–CRAMR and
PHY–AUR techniques was analyzed by relying on exten-
sive simulations, showing that both schemes are capable
of achieving a high successful authentication probability
and a low false alarm rate, especially at sufficiently
high SNRs.
It is worth mentioning that all the aforementioned
constitutions [180]–[186] have primarily been focused
on exploiting the device fingerprints or channel charac-
teristics by relying on their intrinsic randomness. How-
ever, these stochastic features are beyond our control. As
| Proceedings of the IEEE 29
Zou et al. : A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances, and Future Trends
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
a consequence, in [187]–[189], Yu et al. explored the
benefits of a sophisticated deliberate fingerprint embed-
ding mechanism for physical-layer “challenge–response”
authentication, which facilitated striking flexible perfor-
mance tradeoffs by design. More precisely, a stealthy
fingerprint was superimposed onto the data in the delib-
erate fingerprinting mechanism, while additionally both
the data and an authentication message were transmitted
separately by relying on conventional tag-based authenti-
cation methods [190]. Naturally, the authentication mes-
sage used in conventional tag-based methods reduces the
spectral efficiency, while at the same time, being exposed
to eavesdropping. By contrast, a deliberately embedded
fingerprint can be designed by ensuring that it has high
spectral efficiency and remains impervious to eavesdrop-
ping. It was shown in [187]–[189] that a compelling tra-
deoff between the stealth, security, and robustness can be
struck by the deliberate fingerprint embedding-based ap-
proach in wireless fading environments.
Having presented a range of physical-layer authenti-
cation techniques [180]–[190], let us now consider the
integration of physical-layer security with classic crypto-
graphic approaches [179], [191]–[193]. Traditionally, the
cryptographic techniques relying on secret keys have
been employed for protecting the communication confi-
dentiality. However, the distribution and management
of secret keys remains quite a challenging task in wire-
less networks. To this end, Abdallah et al. [179] have
investigated the subject of physical-layer cryptography
by exploiting the existing ARQ protocol for achieving
the reliable exchange of secret keys between the legiti-
mate users without any information leakage to passive
eavesdroppers. Specifically, in [191], the secret bits
were distributed across the ARQ packets and only the
1-b ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate receiver
was exploited for key sharing. It was shown in [191]
that a useful nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved even
when the wiretap channel spanning from the source to
the eavesdropper has a better condition than the legiti-
mate main channel.
Additionally, Xiao et al. studied the benefits of ARQ
mechanisms in terms of generating so-called dynamic se-
crets by taking advantage of the inevitable information
loss in error-prone wireless communications, where the
dynamic secrets are constantly extracted from the com-
munication process with the aid of hash functions.1 It
was shown in [192] that the dynamic secret mechanism
is complementary to the family of existing security proto-
cols and it has the benefit of being time-variant, hence
remains hard to reveal. However, in [191] and [192], the
ARQ feedback was assumed to be perfectly received and
decoded without errors, which may not be practical due
to the presence of hostile channel impairments. In order
to make these investigations more realistic, Khiabani and
Wei [193] modeled the practical ARQ feedback channel
as a correlated erasure channel and evaluated both the
secrecy outage probability and the secrecy capacity of
ARQ-aided physical-layer cryptography. It was shown in
[193] that a significant secrecy improvement can be
achieved even when the eavesdropper’s channel condi-
tions are unknown to the legitimate users.
In summary, we have presented an in-depth review con-
cerning the integration of physical-layer security with clas-
sic wireless security mechanisms, including physical-layer
authentication and cryptography. As shown in Fig. 24,
the physical-layer authentication techniques may be clas-
sified into three categories, namely the RF-hardware-
properties-based, wireless-channel-characteristics-based,
and deliberate-fingerprint-based authentication ap-
proaches [180]–[189]. Meanwhile, in the subject of
physical-layer cryptography, the existing research efforts
[191]–[193] have mainly been focused on exploiting the
classic ARQ protocol for securing the exchange of se-
cret keys between legitimate users, where even the realistic
practical ARQ feedback associated with transmission errors
has been considered.
VIII . OPEN CHALLENGES AND
FUTURE WORK
This section presents a range of challenging open issues
and future directions for wireless security research. As
mentioned in the previous sections, extensive research
efforts have been devoted to this subject, but numerous
challenges and issues still remain open at the time of
writing.
A. Mixed Attacks in Wireless Networks
Most of the physical-layer security research [119]–
[193] only addressed the eavesdropping attacks, but has
neglected the joint consideration of different types of
wireless attacks, such as eavesdropping and DoS attacks.
It will be of particularly importance to explore new tech-
niques of jointly defending against multiple types of
1A hash function is any function that is capable of converting an
input data of variable size to an output data of fixed size.
Fig. 24. Classification of physical-layer authentication
and cryptography.
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wireless attacks, which may be termed as mixed wireless
attacks. In order to effectively guard against mixed at-
tacks including both eavesdropping and DoS attacks, we
should aim for minimizing the detrimental impact of in-
terference inflicted by DoS attacks on the legitimate
transmission. The security defense mechanism should
not only consider the CSI of the interfering ink spanning
from the DoS attacker to the legitimate receiver, but ide-
ally should also take into account the CSI of the wiretap
link between the legitimate transmitter and the eaves-
dropper, in addition to the CSI of the main link from the
legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver. It will
be of interest to investigate the security defense mecha-
nisms in different scenarios in the presence of both full
and partial knowledge of the CSI of the main link as
well as of the interfering link and that of the wiretap
link. The full CSI-based scenario will provide a theoreti-
cal performance upper bound as a guide for developing
new signal processing algorithms to guard against mixed
attacks. Moreover, considering the fact that the eaves-
dropper remains silent and the CSI of the wiretap chan-
nel is typically unknown, it is of practical interest to
conceive security protocols for the scenario, where the
eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable.
B. Joint Optimization of Security, Reliability,
and Throughput
Security, reliability, and throughput constitute the
main driving factors for the research and development of
wireless networks [194]. In conventional wireless sys-
tems, the mechanisms assuring security, reliability, and
throughput are designed individually and separately,
which is however potentially suboptimal, since the three
factors are coupled and affect each other [195]. For ex-
ample, the reliability and throughput of the main link
can be improved by increasing the source’s transmit
power, which however also increases the capacity of the
wiretap channel spanning from the source to the eaves-
dropper and raises the risk that the eavesdropper suc-
ceeds in intercepting the source message through the
wiretap link. Similarly, although increasing the data rate
at SN improves the security level by reducing the proba-
bility of an intercept event, it comes at the expense of a
degradation in transmission reliability, since the outage
probability of the main link increases for higher data
rates. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the joint
optimization of security, reliability, and throughput for
the sake of maintaining secure, reliable, and high-rate
wireless communications, which is an open challenge to
be solved in the future. The goal of the joint optimiza-
tion is to maximize the wireless security performance
under the target reliability and throughput requirements.
For example, convex optimization and game theory may
be considered for formulating and solving the security–
reliability–throughput tradeoff in wireless networks.
C. Cross-Layer Wireless Security Design
and Analysis
Presently, cross-layer-aided security design is in its in-
fancy. The goal of wireless cross-layer-aided security de-
sign is to enable efficient information exchange among
different protocol layers for the sake of improving the
level of wireless security with minimal network overhead.
In general, wireless networks adopt the layered OSI pro-
tocol architecture that consists of the physical layer, the
MAC layer, the network layer, the transport layer, and
the application layer. Traditionally, the aforementioned
protocol layers have been protected separately in order to
meet their individual communications security require-
ments, including their authenticity, integrity, and confi-
dentiality [10]. However, these traditional layered
security mechanisms are potentially inefficient, since
each protocol layer introduces additional computational
complexity and latency. For example, in order to meet
the authenticity requirements, the existing wireless net-
works typically adopt multiple authentication approaches
at different layers, including MAC-layer authentication,
network-layer authentication, and transport-layer authen-
tication. The employment of multiple separate authenti-
cation mechanisms at different protocol layers improves
the security level of wireless networks, which, however,
comes at the expense of a high complexity and latency.
As a consequence, it will be of high interest to explore
the benefits of cross-layer-aided wireless security in or-
der to guard against the aforementioned mixed wireless
attacks. Intuitively, the physical-layer characteristics
and properties of wireless channels may also be further
exploited by the upper-layer security algorithms, in-
cluding the user authentication, secret key generation,
and data protection algorithms. It is anticipated that
the cross-layer security framework will further improve
the wireless security at a reduced cost, as compared to the
traditional layered security mechanisms.
D. Physical-Layer Security for the Emerging
5G Systems
Given the proliferation of smart devices and the in-
creasing demand for multimedia communications, the
amount of mobile traffic has substantially grown in re-
cent years and it may soon exceed the capacity of the op-
erational fourth-generation (4G) mobile communications
systems [196]. To meet this challenging requirement,
substantial efforts have been devoted to the research and
development of the fifth-generation (5G) mobile systems
[197]–[200] relying on advanced wireless technologies,
such as the massive MIMOs and millimeter wave
(mmWave) solutions. Meanwhile, it is expected that a
strict security requirement is desired for the 5G systems,
since more and more sensitive information (e.g., finan-
cial data, personal e-mails, and files) will be transmitted
wirelessly [196]–[198]. To this end, physical-layer secu-
rity as a beneficial complement to conventional security
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mechanisms will have a great potential in the context
of 5G systems. For instance, by deploying a large num-
ber of antennas in 5G systems, the aforementioned ar-
tificial noise and beamforming assisted techniques can
be readily utilized for improving the transmission per-
formance of legitimate users, while degrading the re-
ception quality of eavesdroppers. However, the
application of massive MIMOs for enhancing the
physical-layer security also has its own challenges to be
addressed, such as the deleterious effects of pilot con-
tamination, power allocation, and channel reciprocity
[196]. Therefore, it is of high importance to explore
the opportunities and challenges of combining the
physical-layer security techniques with 5G enabling
technologies, such as massive MIMOs and mmWave
solutions.
E. Field Experiments for Physical-Layer Security
Investigations
As discussed above, there are various physical-layer
security schemes including the artificial noise, beam-
forming, and diversity-aided security enhancement ap-
proaches, which have been shown to be effective in
terms of improving both the secrecy capacity and the
secrecy outage probability of wireless communications
[126]–[146]. However, their security benefits have so
far only been shown theoretically relying on idealized
simplifying assumptions, such as the availability of per-
fect CSI knowledge [201], [202]. By considering the
artificial-noise-based method as an example, the accu-
rate CSI of the main channel is required for the appro-
priate design of an artificial noise, so that the
legitimate receiver remains unaffected by the noise,
while the eavesdropper is interfered with. However, re-
gardless of the specific channel estimation methods
used [148], [149], estimation errors always contaminate
the estimation of the CSI, hence the perfect CSI esti-
mation cannot be achieved in practical wireless sys-
tems. Given an inaccurate CSI, it is impossible to
devise an artificial noise that only interferes with the
eavesdropper without affecting the legitimate receiver.
Typically, the less accurate the CSI of the main chan-
nel, the more interference is received at the legitimate
receiver, hence resulting in a degradation of the wire-
less physical-layer security. Similarly, the CSI estima-
tion errors would also cause a performance degradation
for the beamforming- and diversity-aided security ap-
proaches. However, it remains unclear to what extent
the CSI estimation error affects the attainable physical-
layer security performance in terms of the secrecy ca-
pacity and secrecy outage probability. It will be of
great benefit to conduct field experiments for the sake
of verifying the efficiency of various physical-layer se-
curity approaches in real wireless communications
systems in the presence of both jamming and eaves-
dropping attacks.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a survey of the wireless
security challenges and defense mechanisms conceived
for protecting the authenticity, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of wireless transmissions against mali-
cious attacks. We have discussed the range of wireless at-
tacks and security threats potentially experienced at
different protocol layers from the application layer to the
physical layer, which are classified into application-layer
and transport-layer attacks, network-layer, MAC-layer as
well as physical-layer attacks. Then, existing security par-
adigms and protocols conceived for guarding against the
different protocol layers’ attacks have been reviewed in
the context of several widely deployed wireless net-
works, including the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and
LTE. Bearing in mind that wireless transmissions are
highly vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks owing to the
broadcast nature of radio propagation, we have also dis-
cussed the state of the art in physical-layer security,
which is emerging as a promising paradigm of defending
the wireless transmissions against eavesdropping attacks
by exploiting the physical-layer characteristics of wireless
channels. More specifically, several physical-layer secu-
rity techniques, including information-theoretic security,
artificial-noise-aided security, security-oriented beamform-
ing, diversity-assisted security, and physical-layer secret
key generation approaches have been presented as well as
compared. Additionally, we have summarized various types
of wireless jamming attacks along with their detection and
prevention techniques. Finally, we have also discussed the
integration of physical-layer security into classic wireless
authentication and cryptography, as well as highlighted a
range of open challenges to be addressed:
• mixed wireless attacks, where new theories and
techniques have to be explored for jointly defend-
ing the system against multiple types of wireless
attacks;
• joint optimization of security, reliability, and
throughput, where an efficient wireless transmis-
sion mechanism has to be developed by maximiz-
ing the security performance under specific target
reliability and throughput requirements;
• cross-layer wireless security design, where a
cross-layer security framework has to be investi-
gated for the sake of improving the wireless secu-
rity at a reduced security overhead and latency as
compared to the conventional layered security
mechanisms, where the OSI protocol layers are
protected separately;
• 5G physical-layer security, where the combination
of physical-layer security with 5G enabling tech-
nologies, such as massive MIMOs and mmWave
solutions has to be explored for the sake of meet-
ing the strict security requirements imposed by
the emerging 5G communication systems;
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• field experiments, where the efficiency of various
physical-layer security approaches has to be veri-
fied with the aid of field tests in real wireless
communications systems without the idealized
simplifying assumptions that are routinely used in
theoretical studies.
Based on the solutions presented throughout this pa-
per, we provide some general guidelines for wireless
communications security design.
• Wireless networks are based on the layered OSI
protocol architecture that consists of the applica-
tion layer, the transport layer, the network layer,
the MAC layer, and the physical layer. Each layer
will be protected in order to meet the security re-
quirements of wireless networks. Bearing in mind
the fact that the different layers support different
protocols and exhibit different security vulnera-
bilities, the security mechanisms invoked by the
different wireless protocols should be customized
so as to guard against malicious attacks as effi-
ciently as possible.
• The security paradigms, such as user authentica-
tion and data encryption used in conventional
wireless networks, are typically designed separately
at the different protocol layers, which, however,
results in high latency and overhead. To this end,
cross-layer security would be a candidate for pro-
tecting wireless networks against various attacks.
To be specific, the physical-layer characteristics of
wireless channels may be potentially considered
and exploited for designing or customizing the up-
per-layer security algorithms, including the iden-
tity authentication, key generation, and so on.
• The secrecy capacity of wireless communications
in the presence of eavesdroppers may be severely
degraded due to the time-varying multipath fad-
ing effects, which may be significantly mitigated
by exploiting a range of diversity-aided tech-
niques, such as time diversity, frequency diver-
sity, and spatial diversity. For example, spatial
diversity can be achieved for the sake of attaining
the wireless secrecy capacity improvements by
using multiple antennas at the legitimate trans-
mitter and/or the legitimate receiver.
• The multiuser scheduling may be employed for the
sake of achieving the multiuser diversity gain to
improve the wireless secrecy capacity. Addition-
ally, multiuser MIMO may be invoked for further
improvements in secrecy capacity, which combines
the benefits of the multiuser diversity as well as
the MIMO diversity and multiplexing gains.
• Artificial noise generation techniques may be used
for improving the wireless physical-layer security
against eavesdropping attacks by ensuring that
only the eavesdropping attackers are adversely af-
fected by the artificial noise, while the legitimate
receiver is unaffected. In order to maximize the se-
curity benefits of using the artificial noise assisted
method, the power sharing between the desired in-
formation-bearing signals and the artificial noise
should be given careful attention.
• It is worth mentioning that additional power re-
sources are dissipated in generating the artificial
noise to confuse the eavesdropper. Given a fixed
total transmit power, increasing the artificial noise
power is capable of deteriorating the eavesdrop-
per’s channel condition; it, however, comes at the
cost of performance degradation of the legitimate
receiver, since less transmit power is available for
the desired signal transmission. Hence, the power
allocation between the artificial noise and desired
signal should be carefully considered for the sake
of optimizing the wireless physical-layer security.
• Beamforming approaches may also be invoked for
improving the wireless security design, which en-
ables the legitimate transmitter to send its infor-
mation signal in a particular direction to the
legitimate receiver by ensuring that the signal re-
ceived at the legitimate receiver experiences con-
structive interference, whereas that received at
an eavesdropper experiences destructive interfer-
ence. Moreover, combining the beamforming and
the artificial-noise-aided techniques would further
enhance the wireless physical-layer security
against eavesdropping attacks.
• The security benefits of the artificial noise gener-
ation and beamforming techniques are typically
maximized at the cost of a throughput or reliabil-
ity degradation. The conventional mechanisms as-
suring the security, reliability, and throughput
are designed separately, which are not optimized
jointly. It is therefore suggested to consider the
joint optimization of security, reliability, and
throughput for secure wireless communications.
For example, the joint optimization problem may
be addressed by maximizing the wireless security
performance under the target reliability and
throughput requirements.
• CSIs of the main channel and/or the wiretap
channel are essential in assuring the wireless
physical-layer security against eavesdropping at-
tacks. Both the artificial noise and beamforming-
aided security approaches rely on the CSIs. The
accuracy of estimated CSIs has a significant im-
pact on the physical-layer security performance
(e.g., the secrecy capacity). It is thus suggested to
employ the pilot-based channel estimation ap-
proaches, rather than the semiblind or blind
channel estimation, for the sake of obtaining
accurate CSIs.
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• Performing the accurate channel estimation in-
creases the complexity of the wireless transceiver,
especially in fast-fading channels, where the CSI
has to be estimated more frequently and the CSI
feedback rate has to be increased, resulting in
higher transmission overhead in terms of both
bandwidth and power. Hence, some balanced sys-
tem design principles are suggested, where the
wireless secrecy capacity may be sacrificed with
the intention of reducing the CSI estimation com-
plexity and feedback overhead.
• Physical-layer key generation and agreement
techniques are capable of generating secret keys
based on the random variations of wireless fad-
ing channels for securing wireless networks
without the need for a fixed key management in-
frastructure. However, in static environments,
where the wireless nodes are stationary, the
channel fading would fluctuate slowly, resulting
in a limited number of secret bits to be gener-
ated. In these cases, we may consider the em-
ployment of MIMO-aided and relay-assisted
methods for enhancing the channel’s randomness
for the sake of improving the secret key genera-
tion rate.
• Wireless communications can be disrupted by a
jammer at the physical layer by transmitting an
interfering signal. Although the FHSS technique
is capable of effectively guarding against some of
the known physical-layer jamming attacks, the
frequency hopping pattern agreement between
the legitimate transceivers is challenging in wire-
less networks. It is therefore advisable to com-
bine FHSS with physical-layer security by
exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels
for the frequency hopping pattern agreement. h
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